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PREFACE
 
The work performed under the statistics contract should be appraised
 
not only in the light of Korean political and social instabilities during
 
the past five years but also with recognition of the effects of their
 
history upon the character of the Korean people. An American visitor
 
arriving in Seoul after some hours in Tokyo is likely to be impressed
 
by contrasts. The Japanese, for all their modernity, conform to the
 
Western image of "the inscrutable Oriental." The Koreans are extroverts -­
"the Irish of the Orient." Women are seen walking in long strides. A
 
momentary pause on the street may attract a circle of eager students who
 
regard the visitor as an opportunity to practice their English or to
 
solicit advice concerning overseas educational possibilities.
 
Perhaps such traits reflect a reaction from Korea's historical
 
isolation as "the Hermit Kingdom." Hemmed in between two larger neighbors,
 
China and Japan, it long repulsed external influences and was internally
 
absorbed in endless factional struggles. Rivalries among "the three
 
kingdoms" -- still surviving in the civil service and the army in the
 
form of regional factions -- and between family groups -- the exogamous
 
clans -- dominated public affairs. Power was unsheathed and those who
 
lacked it developed subtle methods for the maintenance of individual
 
security. Have these ancient characteristics entirely disappeared?
 
This could hardly be expected.
 
Nor is it surprising that the Korean people encountered by
 
Westerners today are likely to exhibit ambivalent traits. They may
 
be ardent friends and affectionate family members, but incompassionate
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toward opponents; loyal to aspirations and ideals, but unhesitant
 
about putting personal advantage above group or national interests;
 
highly intelligent and industrious, but slow to cooperate in a common
 
cause; eager for advancement, but undisciplined in the use of talents.
 
When such contradictions are experienced, the visiting technician
 
may have a sense of frustration. His accomplishments evaporate.
 
Understandings upon which he depended are not followed by the expected
 
results. To what extent omnipresent difficulties of communication are
 
responsible for his bafflement is seldom wholly clear.
 
Despite mutual difficulties of understanding, the eagerness of
 
this old but newly young nation for national adulthood is a constant
 
stimulus to the desire of sympathetic visitors to assist in its attainment.
 
A large majority of the field staff of the statistics project and members
 
of their families developed a strong affection for the Korean people and
 
embraced their cultural interests to a degree far beyond "the call of
 
duty." They formed many intimate and enduring personal friendships.
 
In addition to the necessity of learning and adjusting to unfamiliar
 
psychological patterns, the work of visiting statisticians has been
 
affected by specific cultural and institutional forms quite different from
 
those with which they are familiar.
 
For example, according to the Korean Central Weights and Measures
 
Bureau, as reported in The Korean Republic, "three different systems ­
metric, pound-yard and chok-kwan ... are commonly used in Korea but
 
mixed" (emphasis here supplied). Hence, "an individual in the Korean
 
community must remember all units in all three systems of weights and
 
measures." Statistical comparisons among physical measurements may be
 
difficult!
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To cite another illustration with statistical implications, individual
 
Korean ages can be made to conform to Western conceptions when it is
 
remembered that each calendar year within which a person has lived is
 
counted as one whole year in totaling his age. He is one year of age
 
at birth and two on the following New Year's Day. The simplicity of
 
the conversion diminishes, however, when it is learned that Korea's
 
twelve-month calendar is lunar, with an extra month thrown in every
 
third year or so to bring it into closer conformity with the solar year.
 
Hence, New Year's Day is migratory in relation to the Western Gregorian
 
calendar.
 
The Westerner's education in such elements of Korean culture will
 
be incomplete if he remains only long enough to claim homeland Federal
 
tax exemption. The staff of the Korea statistics project, though composed
 
of changing personnel, was long enough in the field as a group to acquire
 
much understanding of the indigenous culture that could be passed on
 
from individual to individual member, without compelling each to learn
 
anew "the hard way" by personal experience. At the end of five years,
 
the group had arrived at "the beginning of wisdom": it was aware of how
 
little its members knew about tae country and the people they had served.
 
Yet they were able to look back upon no small record of accomplishment,
 
difficult as it might be in some respects to know how much of the gain
 
resulted from their efforts and how much might have occurred without
 
them in the normal course of social evolution,
 
The formal purpose of this final report of the project is to comply
 
with contract requirements, The project director who prepared it believes
 
that the five-year record has more than formal interest. He hopes that
 
his attempt to summarize the record may be persuasive that despite
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uncertainties of appraisal, many unforeseen difficulties and many short­
comings in results, the project has substantially advanced significant
 
objectives that can never, in any country, be completely reached.
 
An account of work and project accomplishments in full detail has
 
not been attempted. It will be an important accomplishment, as we
 
think, if pressures have been released within Korea toward the further
 
attainment of contract objectives after contract termination. The
 
hope for this rests in part upon seven published volumes in the English
 
and Korean languages, termed "interim reports to the Government of the
 
Republic of Korea," that the Statistical Advisory Group is leaving
 
behind to serve as guides for further statistical improvement. These
 
have been supplemented by a ]arger number of partially authored publica­
tions, memoranda, other communications, and oral advice and teachings.
 
The present report, then, is more of a guide to the work done under
 
the contract than a zomplete record of it. It describes the beginnings
 
of proposals for statistical assistance to the Korean Government, the
 
main lines of effort as the work progressed, the condition of statistics
 
in Korea as first encountered, an estimate of the principal accomplish­
ments of the program, and an outline of the principal statistical needs
 
that remain.
 
Stuart A. Rice
 
President
 
Surveys & Research Corporation
 
May 31, 1963
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I
 
BACKGROUND OF KOREA STATISTICS PROJECT
 
The idea of helping Korea with its statistics evolved over several
 
years in the course of events with which present personnel of Surveys &
 
Research Corporation were closely associated. The historical sequence
 
gave shape to the objectives and character of the work ultimately
 
undertaken by that firm under contract with the International Cooperation
 
Administration, predecessor of the Agency for International Development.
 
The sequence began with two statistical missions to Japan during
 
the early postwar period. Both were headed by Stuart A. Rice, then an
 
Assistant Director of the United States Bureau of the Budget, in charge
 
of its Office of Statistical Standards. The first mission in late 1946
 
was organized at the request of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
 
Commander, Allied Powers, whose organization was known as "SCAP." The
 
responsibilities of American military authorities in the Far East were
 
at that time centered in Tokyo and included South Korea, whose economic
 
and statistical problems already engaged, though somewhat distantly,
 
the attention of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section, headed by
 
General William F. Marquat.
 
Memories of the two statistical missions to Japan lingered
 
throughout the area. Following his departure from Federal service
 
at the end of 1954, Dr. Rice joined in organizing Stuart Rice Associates,
 
predecessor of Surveys & Research Corporation; and in January 1956, on
 
its behalf, undertook a study of the statistical needs of the Ryukyu
 
Islands. The study was requested by General Charles K. Gailey, Chief
 
of Civil Affairs and Military Government of the Department of the Army,
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and was under contract with that Department. While preparing his report- /
 
from Eighth Army Headquarters in Tokyo, Dr. Rice was asked to extend his
 
trip to Seoul for a brief examination of Korean statistics and the possi­
bilities of their improvement, In the Korean capital he met with
 
American aid officials, United Nations personnel, and Korean official
 
and intellectual leaders. All professed their concern about the inadequacy
 
of the country's statistical data.
 
American technicians in the Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC),
 
predecessor of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), exhibited
 
frustration at the untrustworthiness of the factual tools they employed
 
in seeking the country's rehabilitation. One said with exasperation that
 
he wished he knew whether the nation's population was ten or twenty millions.
 
Behind this figure of speech was anxiety as to whether the food require­
ments of South Korea might not be grossly overestimated.-/ A medically
 
1/ A classified document.
 
2/ His remark, though serious, was not understood literally. Korea's
 
"1st Population Survey," as recorded in Korea Statistical Yearbook 1961,
 
Table 27, on September 1, 1955 (the distinction from prior "censuses"
 
is not clear) reported a total population of 21,526,374. Nearly a
 
decade earlier, but before the Korean War, the United States Military
 
Government had reported 19,369 thousand persons in a "de facto" count
 
on August 25, 1946. Later, in 1947, a "citizen registration" by the
 
same authority obtained a figure of 17,800 thousands, obviously short
 
of the true total. In the light of the 1960 census results, the 1955
 
census total with which they are usually compared appears to reflect
 
an underenumeratdon.
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trained Korean in American employ attributed much uncertainty concerning
 
demographic and health problems to the gross unreliability of vital
 
statistics, the haphazard methods of obtaining which he described.
 
Several Americans admitted to ineffectiveness in their work in
 
the absence of simple but dependable facts about the nation's economy.
 
1/

Inflation was unchecked,- but data on prices, production, and other
 
factors associated with the problem were either unavailable or discredited.
 
In most instances, statistical deficiencies were attributed or attributable
 
to the uncontrolled and unscientific methods by which data were obtained.
 
A desire by responsible Korean officials for American assistance
 
and advice in improving national statistics was expressed at a farewell
 
dinner for Dr. Rice arranged by Mr. Wood and Dr. Chawner. This was
 
attended by high ranking members of the executive and legislative branches
 
of the ROK Government. In his remarks, the guest quoted the views of
 
leading Japanese economists that their nation had undertaken and lost
 
its'war with the United States because of dependence upon inferior
 
statistics. In a response, the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee
 
of the ROK General Assembly observed that if Japan, with a higher state
 
of development than Korea, had needed statistical help from its erstwhile
 
enemy, how much more in need, aud how much more entitled to it, was his
 
own country. He pleaded for a statistical mission to Korea similar to
 
those that had been sent to Japan.
 
In reviewing this request in relation to their own statistical needs,
 
OEC officials faced the question: 
 in whose behalf should external assistance
 
1/ It was later brought under effective control, largely through the
 
efforts of Dr. Lowell J. Chawner, Economic Advisor to Mr. C. Tyler Wood,
 
the Economic Coordinator for Korea.
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in statistics be provided? OEC itself needed help in making the best use
 
of available data and in obtaining better data; but such help would
 
not necessarily touch the source of the problem. This lay in the general
 
backwardness of Korean statistical development and the overall inefficiency
 
of Korean statistical organization and practices. Mr. Wood and his chief
 
advisors agreed that if technical aid in statistical improvement were
 
provided, the assistance should be broad and given to the Korean Government
 
rather than the OEC.
 
This conclusion became an accepted principle for further discussion -­
one of the two basic guidelines for the subsequent Korea statistics 
project. Its circumvention was sometimes sought by OEC subordinates 
who, understandably, felt in need of statistical help in their own 
particular activities. 
The second guideline upon which Mr. Wood and his advisors agreed
 
was a corollary of the first: technical assi3tance to Korea in statistics,
 
if it were to touch the basic shortcomings, must be given to its govern­
ment as a whole. Like the first, this principle was often misunderstood
 
and sometimes evaded throughout the life of the later project; though
 
misunderstandings in this instance were greater among Korean than American
 
personnel and hence often more difficult than the first to deal with.
 
Misunderstandings of the second principle reflected the customary
 
relationships between OEC and ROK Government agencies. "Assistance to
 
the government as a whole" did not conform to the conception of "counterparts"
 
upon which these customary relationships were based. Most visiting
 
technicians were expected to work with their "opposite numbers" in the
 
Korean administration, and it was natural to look for the counterparts
 
of American statistical advisors within some particular ROK agency.
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However, the statistical activities of the ROK Government, like
 
those of the United States and most other Western nations, were highly
 
"decentralized." 
 They existed in practically all major subdivisions of
 
the central government, in pseudo-governmental agencies, and in provincial
 
and other subordinate units of administration. As in Washington three
 
decades ago, no single voice in Seoul could speak in technical or
 
administrative terms for all of 
these units, or evoke their compliance
 
with common technical and professional standards. 
 The statistical
 
issues requiring the attention of advisors from the outside world
 
involved all such units and not any one of them exclusively.
 
Difficulties in applying the principle of service to the entire
 
ROK Government arose also from the initially latent but easily aroused
 
desire of particular statistical organizations to extend their juris­
diction and influence. 
 The largest of them, the Bureau of Statistics
 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs, claimed authority (usually without
 
recognition by the claimee) over all government statistics.1 /
 
Although the discussions of 1956 in Seoul laid the ground for a
 
Korea statistics project, progress toward its formulation was slow.
 
An intervening jurisdictional question was removed at 
a luncheon conference
 
En Washington among Messrs. Wood, Marquat, Clarkson Stevens (an advisor
 
to General Marquat), and Rice. 
Which of the first two should take responsi­
)ility for statistical assistance to the ROK Government? 
In the opinion
 
)fall present, responsibility belonged to Mr. Wood's OEC. 
 Some months
 
ater, negotiations were initiated by the International Cooperation
 
1/ The Bureau's authorities were later enlarged by its transfer to the
Economic Planning Board in the summer of 1961 and by the promulgation of

the Statistics Law in January 1962.
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Administration with Stuart Rice Associates, and on April 23, 1958, 
a
 
contract was 
signed with that firm which a month earlier had been
 
renamed Surveys & Research Corporation.
 
In its preamble the contract declared that the Government of the
 
Republic of Korea "has requested the aid of the United States in
 
providing technical assistance in the improvement of its national
 
statistical program" and that "the Contractor is willing and able to
 
assist the Government in this respect." Two statistical advisors and
 
a secretary 
- administrative assistant were 
to be sent to Korea for
 
approximately two years. r.. 
Rice was to act as project manager, was
 
to proceed to Korea for a preliminary survey, perform nine months of
 
services in Washington and Korea, and be supported while in the field
 
by Mr. Libert Ehrman, the contractor's vice president, in Washington.
 
By later amendment, the title of Dr. Rice was changed to project director
 
and Mr. Ehrman assumed more formal duties as assistant project director.
 
The contract was to run for thirty months and the obligation of funds
 
not exceeding $150,000 was authorized.
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OBJECTIVS AND "SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED"
 
The objectives of the contract were extremely broad and the
 
services prescribed were numerous and detailed. 
Differences of
 
judgment concerning program emphasis and changes in the direction of
 
specific programs as work proceeded were inevitable. Even without the
 
latitude given by the contract, they could scarcely be avoided within
 
a society which underwent two political revolutions and experienced
 
continuous social and economic instability during the contract period.
 
Shifts in the power structure of the ROK Government and displacements
 
of key officials became almost a pattern of normality to which adjust­
ments of work under the contract were required. It was often essential
 
for the contractor's field staff to provide a stability and continuity
 
in statistical programs that were otherwise absent.
 
As its generalized objective the contract called for assistance
 
to the ROK Government "in developing and implementing an improved
 
statistics program covering organization, administration and operations."
 
This phrasing was not altered in the course of seven successive amendments,
 
most of which had only an incidental effect upon the scope of the work.
 
rhus, Amendment'No. I added the cost of certain premiums 
to the contractor's
 
reimbursements; No. 2 authorized the addition of census 
and data
 
3rocessing advisors to the field staff and added some administrative
 
)rovisions; 
No. 3 called upon the contractor for specifications and
 
idvice in the selection of census equipment, and again added administrative
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provisions; No. 4 will be described presently; No. 5 transferred a
 
program to train selected Koreans in data processing machine operations
 
from a locus in the United States to Japan or the Philippines; No. 6
 
authorized assignment of the contract as collateral for borrowing
 
working funds; and No. 7 pertained to certain administrative require­
ments.
 
Among the seven amendments, No. 4, entered into June 1, 1960,
 
increased to $1,072,210 the funds authorized for the project and
 
extended its effective period to May 31, 1963. It codified all preceding
 
contract provisions and is the document to which subsequent citations,
 
including those in the present report, relate. The detailed statement
 
in the original contract of "Services To Be Performed by the Contractor"
 
underwent little change, but Amendment No. 4 greatly improved the
 
contractor's capacities for performing them.
 
The fact that as the project developed little change was required
 
in these specified "Services" was due to their comprehensiveness. They
 
were enumerated in sixteen paragraphs in Article I. In total these were
 
a catchall, permitting the contractor the widest latitude in selecting
 
statistical activities or issues concerning which his detailed efforts
 
seemed most likely to further general objectives. The first of the
 
sixteen paragraphs read as follows:
 
"Survey the existing statistical activities of the Government
 
to determine the adequacy of the types of data presently collected
 
and to pinpoint deficiencies in coverage, timeliness, accuracy,
 
methods, distribution and use of information. Among the types of
 
statistical data to which consideration will be given are: popula­
tion; vital statistics; public health and medical care; labor force;
 
non-agricultural and agricultural employment; unemployment; wage
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rates; productivity; industrial injuries; education, criminal
 
and judicial statistics; agricultural, manufacturing, mineral
 
production; distribution and service trades; wholesale and retail
 
pricee; prices paid and received by farmers; government finance;
 
money and banking; financial reports on business; housing, trans­
portation and utilities; foreign trade and shipping; balance of
 
international payments; consumer income, expenditures, and savings;
 
national income and product; natural resources."
 
The development of statistics concerning the preceding subjects,
 
together with other services prescribed in the contract, have been in
 
other countries a highly complex and extended historical process, both
 
technical and administrative. In the United States it has occupied
 
numerous well-staffed units within the Federal Governmenf'for more
 
than a quarter-century.
 
In Korea, services by a few alien technicians within a limited
 
period of time relating to all of the subject areas listed could only
 
be superficial. Alien advisors would be handicapped by the absence of
 
many elements of public understanding upon which good statistics depend;
 
by customarily frequent turnovers of official personnel; by difficulties
 
of communication; and by dimly understood differences of national culture
 
and outlook stemming from a Korean history of more than 4,000 years.
 
The problem confronting the contractor's field staff, then, was how,
 
among the alternatives presented, to find areas within which their assist­
ance would provide the best leverage for general statistical improvement.
 
Such an area was ready-made by the recommendation of the United
 
Nations that all countries conduct censuses of population, housing,
 
and agriculture in or near the decennial year 1960. The United Nations
 
was South Korea's protector. An acceptance of its recommendations appealed
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to the Republic's growing desire to be treated as a sovereign equal
 
within the "family of nations." The proposed census appeared to
 
Korean officials and the public to be an evidence of national maturity;
 
a prelude, perhaps, to international recognition as a United Nations
 
member.
 
There were also special obligations upon the contractor to
 
advise upon census preparations. Implicit in the statistics contract,
 
as indicated in the preceding chapter, was the need of the ROK Government
 
and its American advisors for basic data of types that a census could
 
provide. National planning and programming, especially in a predominantly
 
agricultural nation, must take account of population in relation to
 
resources.
 
In an address to the officers and staff of OEC in 1959, Mr. Libert
 
Ehrman, assistant project director, pointed out that inaccuracies in
 
current estimates of population and of agricultural production had
 
potentially dangerous effects. 
On the one hand, underestimates of
 
population and overestimates of food supplies could lead to hunger and
 
unrest. 
 In an opposite direction, statistical inaccuracies might result
 
in excessive importations of food with unnecessary expenditures of
 
public funds.
 
"Special assistance to the Government in the planning, development,
 
conduct and processing of the 1960 Census in connection with its partici­
pation in the 1960 World Census ..." was prescribed in item 9 of the
 
"Services To Be Performed by the Contractor."
 
Beyond the importance of the census for obtaining specific
 
information was its value in furthering overall contract objectives.
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Even better than in the form quoted in the second paragraph of this
 
chapter, these objectives were epitomized in the sixth of the "Services
 
To Be Performed." This called for the development of "such plans as
 
may be necessary and practicable for improving or extending existing
 
statistical services and their integration into a coherent national
 
statistical system, coordinated in its parts and with an appropriate
 
distribution of responsibilities among and within Government agencies."
 
Without the "integration" of "existing statistical services" into a
 
"coherent national statistical system," 
there could be no substantial
 
and enduring improvement in statistical "organization, administration
 
and operations."
 
As a means toward statistical integration in Korea censuses had
 
high potentials. 
For example, they would provide unexcelled opportuni­
ties within the structure of government for training in statistical
 
procedures. 
A cadre of personnel who had successfully experienced its
 
variety of technical operations might become the nation's statistical
 
leaders in after-years. The importance of training was emphasized in
 
the contract by reference to it in no less than four of the sixteen
 
paragraphs itemizing the "Services To Be Performed by the Contractor."
 
A census would provide opportunity to train Koreans in modern
 
"methods of collecting, compiling, and tabulating data" ("Service"No. 2).
 
It would help the contractor to "assist the Government in developing,
 
supervising and administering programs for training-statistical personnel
 
with a view to increasing the technical proficiency and productivity
 
of the agencies to-which they are attached" ("Service" No. 7). It
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would provide an obvious occasion to "examine the mechanical tabulating
 
equipment requirements of the Government" ("Service" No. 5).
 
Among broader categories of "Services," few statistical enterprises
 
would be as useful as a census "in creating an appreciation by the
 
Korean public of the national needs for reliable information and
 
public support for governmental efforts to secure accurate and
 
timely statistical information" ("Service" No. 11), or to "elevate
 
the prestige of statisticians and the statistical function and to
 
inculcate in Korean personnel a high regard for the quality of informa­
tion given to and compiled by the Government, and to emphasize the
 
necessity for accurate data in formulating sound policies and effective
 
programs in the public service" ("Service" No. 12).-1/
 
Unforeseen reasons that compelled the contractor's field staff to
 
give almost immediate attention to census plans and preparations are
 
explained in Chapter V.
 
1/ Of further though incidental value as a by-product of a census
 
was the prospect of augmenting the technical services of the contractor
 
with assistance from the United Nations. Its World Census Program
 
contemplated visits and expert advice to participating governments

from its own technical staff. The aid actually received at various
 
times from several highly qualified members of the United Nations staff,
 
working in close collaboration with the Statistical Advisory Group of
 
Surveys & Research Corporation, proved to be very helpful.
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III
 
THE WORKING PARTY IN KOREA
 
The project director, Dr. Stuart A. Rice, arrived in Seoul on
 
May 7, 1958, followed a few days later by Mr. Herbert 0. Rogers
 
and Dr. Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, statistical advisors, and Miss Mary
 
Catherine Elward, secretary - administrative assistant. The group
 
was first known as "the Statistics Mission," following the analogy
 
of the statistics missions to Japan. It later was officially called
 
the Statistical Advisory Group, or SAG. Its original members were
 
obligated for two years of service. 
 When the contract was enlarged
 
and extended, new members of SAG filled vacancies and additional posts
 
and were supplemented by short-term consultants. Appendix A lists the
 
names, functions, and periods of service of all members of the field
 
staff during the five-year life of the contract, April 23, 1958, 
to
 
May 31, 1963.
 
The full complement of eight persons to fill positions specified
 
in Amendment No. 4 was never actually reached, if transitional overlaps
 
be disregarded. Delays in obtaining official "clearances" and approvals
 
frequently impaired or canceled the availability of candidates. More­
over, a 1960 policy of retrenchment by USOM required the contractor to
 
leave vacancies unfilled in two of the six professional positions that
 
the contract specified.
 
During this period and until the end of the contract, however, a
 
small staff of Koreans, paid by the ROK Government from counterpart
 
funds as translators and interpreters, added substantially to SAG's
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professional competence. The suave leader of this staff, Mr. Lee, Hee
 
Seung, was highly valued for his wide knowledge of Korean affairs and
 
for his mature and balanced judgments concerning them. Among other
 
competent members of this staff, two university teachers of statistics,
 
Professors Park,Hong Nai and ChoiChi Hoon, were able to make technical
 
contributions to SAG's work while supplementing their own professional
 
training.
 
Before returning to Washington from his initial visit to Korea
 
under the contract in the spring and summer of 1958, the project
 
director designated Mr. Rogers as chief of party. Mr. Rogers was
 
succeeded in that role in January 1960 by Mr. Charles B. Lawrence, Jr.,
 
who had joined the group early in 1959. Mr. Lawrence in turn was followeg
 
in December 1960 by Dr. Benjamin J. Tepping, who remained in charge of
 
the field work until the termination of the contract. During an interval
 
of several months between the conclusion of Mr. Lawrence's services and
 
those of Dr. Tepping, the project director, prolonging a visit to Korea,
 
served as acting chief of party. From the headquarters of Surveys &
 
Research Corporation in Washington, eight supervisory trips in all were
 
made to Korea -- six by the project director and two by the assistant
 
project director.
 
Persons arriving on official business at Kimpo, Seoul's inter­
national airport, are traditionally given a cordial and ceremonious
 
welcome. They are greeted by ROK and USOM representatives, whose rank
 
denotes the importance of the arrivees as locally appraised. The
 
bestowal of flowers, the taking of pictures, and interviews by the press
 
are additional indexes of the significance attached to the event.
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All of these evidences of interest and high official approval
 
were encountered on the first arrival of the project director and
 
original SAG members in 1958, and continued to appear, even though with
 
some anticipated diminution, on similar subsequent occasions. 
The
 
substantial continuity in the character of these ritualistic
 
observances seems noteworthy. 
They took place against a background
 
of violent change within the Korean Government. This change is
 
symbolized in the recollections of the writer by an enormous red band
 
surrounding an immense bouquet presented on an early visit. 
 Imprinted
 
upon this was a felicitous welcome from the Minister of Home Affairs.
 
A few months later the Minister was executed by a successor government
 
which was equally assertive of cordiality toward the statistics project.
 
The project director's arrival at Kimpo Airport in 1958 was
 
accompanied by apologies for the inability of the ROK Government to
 
house its new advisors with its Bureau of Statistics. The Bureau's
 
quarters near the Old Capitol Building were suggestive of wartime
 
"temporaries" in Washington, but more dilapidated and overcrowded.
 
This was a stroke of luck. 
The apologies evidenced an assumption that
 
the statistics advisors were to be counterparts of Bureau of Statistics
 
officials (see Chapter I). The necessity of giving them separate
 
quarters promised some time in which to establish in practice their
 
wider responsibilities.
 
The group was installed in two rooms on 
the top floor of a four-story
 
structure in downtown Seoul, occupied on lower floors by the Korean
 
Information Service. 
 Office furniture was in place. A requisition for
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typewriters produced some ancient machines from the OEC warehouse that
 
made carbon copies without originals. A day or two following occupancy
 
a caterer arrived with a tablecloth for the low Korean conference table
 
upon which he placed a huge cake and other delicacies. These heralded
 
the arrival of the top echelon of the Bureau of Statistics for its
 
official welcome and inauguration of its counterparts.
 
Another symbol of counterpart relationships was unobtrusive. A
 
tiny non-English-speaking Korean schoolgirl lingered about the office
 
at odd hours. She was identified by the advisors to each other as
 
"Susie," but her function was mysterious until it was found that she
 
had been employed by the Bureau of Statistics to dust and be helpful.
 
Of great practical importance in this early period was the assign­
ment to the group by OEC of one of its most skilled interpreters, the
 
youthful Mr. Cho,ILee Jay, promptly known as "Joseph." Mr. Cho's wide
 
reading or personal acquaintance with Western as well as Korean affairs
 
and personalities, his perception of the subtleties of Korean and
 
American relationships, and his exceptional linguistic abilities, made
 
him invaluable in a multitude of situations.
 
The initial discomforts for the group of their assigned quarters,
 
especially the lack of functioning toilets and running water, were
 
supplemented during the summer rains by leaking roofs; and during the
 
following winter by the difficulties of working in unheated offices.
 
The last were alleviated by oil burning stoves, though at the cost -­
since external outlets for the residual gas were lacking -- of
 
respiratory discomfort. Nevertheless, with many reminders about them
 
of the greater discomforts endured by the surviving and returning
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population of Seoul at the end of the Korean War, only a few years
 
earlier, complaints were avoided and were limited to remediable
 
situations.
 
When the group became larger more space was essential. Two
 
successive moves to other downtown locations were made. 
 One took
 
the group into the relatively comfortable Korea Building, a rented
 
structure to which the Bureau of Statistics also moved. By that time
 
the separate and independent identity of the SAG had been better
 
established. 
The final move of SAG, also in company with the Bureau
 
of Statistics, was to the just completed building of the Korean Data
 
Processing Center, in the planning of which SAG had collaborated.
 
There it occupied some of the rooms designed for the use of agencies
 
other than the Bureau of Statistics itself; since, although under the
 
Bureau's control, the building was conceived as a governmentwide
 
utility, for the use of all government agencies which had data process­
ing requirements.
 
From the beginning of work, members of the SAG and their dependents
 
were encouraged as a matter of contractor policy to identify themselves
 
with the Korean community whenever they could do so in ways which were
 
natural and unstrained. "Compounditis," for which American personnel
 
living abroad are so often criticized, was to be avoided. With very
 
few exceptions, this policy has been followed by field staff personnel
 
with satisfaction from the enriching experiences that it has brought them.
 
In keeping with the contract injunction ("Service" No. 11) Lo
 
"assist in creating an appreciation by the Korean public of the national
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needs for reliable information and public support for governmental
 
efforts to secure accurate and timely statistical information," all
 
members of the field staff, including the project director and
 
assistant project director while in Korea, have taken advantage of
 
many opportunities to address Korean audiences. A partial list of
 
these occasions, with speaker and topic, is presented in Appendix B.
 
Among the first, considerable attention was drawn to OEC Technical
 
Lecture No. 8 on "Statistical Development in Korea," presented in
 
the Seoul Chamber of Commerce Building on July 15, 1958, by Stuart A.
 
Rice.
 
It is doubtful, however, whether headlined addresses have been
 
as influential in the cultivation of good will toward the project and
 
an understanding of its objectives as the informal contacts between
 
individual members of the group and individuals of the host country.
 
Facility in the use of the Korean language was highly valued and
 
eagerly sought by the first, as was practice in English by the second.
 
At a time when the group had reached its maximum size, all of its
 
members, or members of their families, or both, were taking lessons
 
in the Korean language. The ability of Miss Norma Collier, SAG
 
secretary - administrative assistant, to make speeches in Korean
 
enhanced the already great esteem in which she was held in the Korean
 
community and rubbed off on her associates. The services contributed
 
by Dr. and Mrs. Tepping as members of the Seoul Municipal Orchestra
 
were regarded with high favor by a musically accomplished and music
 
loving people.
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Such activities occupied the leisure time of group members and
 
undoubtedly contributed during working hours to a continuous succession
 
of visitors from statistical offices of the ROK Government, from
 
universities, and from other organizations, seeking advice about
 
technical questions confronting them.
 
In most cases it was felt important to give these requests
 
sympathetic attention. They sometimes led to the incorporation of
 
advice or recommendations in formal communications. More frequently,
 
the assistance given remained on an oral level. If a complete account
 
of the advisory assistance in statistics given to the ROK Government
 
through its employees could be given, the instances of oral and
 
unrecorded advice would lead all others. The group's published reports
 
would also be overshadowed in number by the numbers of letters and
 
memoranda containing SAG recommendations.
 
A partial and selected list of published and unpublished documents
 
of these various kinds which had the primary purpose of advising or
 
assisting the ROK Government, and were prepared with some degree of
 
formality, appears in Appendix C.
 
In addition to personal consultations of informal types, the group's
 
activities took many forms. They included: systematic inquiry into
 
the procedures of particular agencies in obtaining particular data;
 
comparisons between the data of different agencies to assess their
 
comparability and the reasons for discrepancies; inquiries into the
 
uses made of various statistics; conferences on such matters with
 
Korean officials; participation in meetings arranged by Korean statistical
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offices upon problems confronting them; consultation upon machine process­
ing of data and informal supervision of operations; organization of inter­
agency committees upon questions of common interest, providing guidance
 
and leadership as necessary; assisting ROK officials in preparing
 
statistical organization charts, plans for buildings to house statisti­
cal operations and machine installations; organization of lectures and
 
courses of instruction on such topics as sampling and data processing;
 
assistance to the ROK or USOM in selection of candidates for overseas
 
training in statistics; attendance at ceremonial or social occasions
 
by ROK or USOM invitation; participation in USOM staff meetings and
 
other official gatherings; staff discussion within the SAG itself to
 
formulate preferred lines of procedure or technical recommendations;
 
accompanying ROK officials to the field for statistical inquiries or
 
training purposes; advising USOM officials upon statistical questions
 
when requested, so far as compatible with other duties.
 
Such activities as these have made up the daily work of SAG members.
 
They underlie the accomplishments for which credit may be taken.
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IV 
KOREAN STATISTICS WHEN SAG BEGAN WORK
 
The state of Korean statistics as first encountered by the
 
Statistical Advisory Group was reviewed in its first report of
 
May 29, 1958. This characterized statistical activities and data
 
as "suffering from faulty organization, duplication of effort,
 
inaccess to sources of information, political interference, lack
 
of machinery for coordination, inadequate budgetary support, scarcity
 
of trained personnel, low salaries, poor working space and equipment,
 
the absence of confidentiality in the treatment of data reported
 
(resulting in the penalization of accuracy), and low public esteem
 
for statistics and statisticians."
 
In a visit to Korea in the spring of 1959, Mr. Ehrman noted
 
especially / the "inadequacy of data processing, lack of facilities
 
fit for habitation by the statistical offices, and the extremely poor
 
management of statistical operations.... The statistical functions
 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs were to be found at the lowest rung
 
in the status ladder. The field attracted none of the capable people
 
in the Government; its personnel were underpaid; few incentives
 
existed for improvements in management and coordination."
 
Similar deficiencies could probably be found in most countries whic
 
are still classified as underdeveloped. They reflect inconsistencies
 
not uncommon among nations with authoritarian traditions whose popular
 
1/ As cited in a letter of August 25, 1961, to Mr. Henry Shavell, then
 
in charge of the Program and Economic Policy Division of USOM.
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thinking is still on a pre-scientific level. Such people often give
 
"lip service" to "advanced" institutional forms and processes such
 
as representative government, scientific method, or statistics. 
They
 
have been told that these are important for economic and social
 
development, but they have no actual understanding of the meanings,
 
requirements, or uses of these elements. 
 In this context, the rationale
 
for statistical activity takes on the character of magical thinking;
 
its practice becomes ritualistic.
 
That Korea should exemplify such characteristics is not surprising
 
in view of the tutelage under which its statistical practices were
 
learned. Our inquiries in both Seoul and Tokyo concerning the Japanese
 
impact on Korean statistics have not produced specific information.
 
However, there is no doubt that Japanese directors and supervisors
 
made little effort to help Korean subordinates to understand their work
 
or the technical conceptions involved in it. When the Japanese directors
 
of statistical work left, their Korean subordinates, in effect, remained
 
on the job, continuing their previous motions without knowing the reasons
 
for them. They were thus in no position to imbue their countrymen with
 
a sense of the importance either of their products or their own functions
 
as statisticians. Still, "everyone" knew that statistics, even if not
 
statisticians, were "important' -- though not important enough to dis­
cover why, or how to improve them.
 
Any censure of the Japanese tutors in this connection would be
 
almost as unfair as censure of the Korean pupils who succeeded to their
 
responsibilities. It is not unlikely that the first, with their habits
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of imitation of the West, were almost as lackfng in understanding of
 
the purposes behind their statistical activities as were the second.
 
The following portions of the Summary Report of the first Statistical
 
Mission to Japan, entitled Modernization of Japanese Statistics
 
(April 1947) could be applied to both countries, as here indicated:
 
"There is much evidence that statistics and statisticians
 
in the past have been held in relatively low esteem by the
 
Japanese /Koreans7. The purposes and uses of statistics were
 
not generally understood, and the motives for collecting them
 
were often superficial or ritualistic. At such times statistics
 
became an expression of deference to Western science to which
 
little practical value was attributed. During the war many
 
statistics, whose accuracy was questionable at best, were further
 
distorted by the regime for purposes of propaganda.
 
" ... it is probable that the general quality of Japanese
 
/Korean/ statistics has never been high.... Many of the sta­
tistics supplied the Allied Powers have been inaccurate. Infor­
mation on many problems of critical importance to the Japanese
 
/Korean7/people has been entirely lacking.
 
"The low quality of Japanese /Korean7 statistics seems
 
due chiefly to a national deficiency in 'statistical mindedness.'
 
Responsible officials and the people alike apparently do not
 
understand the need for accurate information. They do not demand
 
... 'to have the facts' about matters on which decisions and
 
policies are being made."
 
Japan's statistical development in the last decade and a half
 
provides a brilliant chapter in its postwar record of recovery and
 
advance. Korea's progress in the same field has started later from
 
lower levels. Nevertheless, it can receive from its larger neighbor
 
not only the encouragement drawn from an inspiring example but many
 
forms of practical assistance. In the development of Korea's sta­
tistical administration, the growth of a statistical profession, and
 
the application of such modern techniques as inter-industry relations
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analysis, Japanese statisticians and statistical agencies have already
 
provided valuable supplements to the efforts of the Statistical Advisory
 
1/
 
Group in Korea.
 
A second underlying cause of Korea's poor statistics was its
 
dependence for the collection of survey-type information upon the
 
channels of communication that traditionally tied together its
 
hierarchical system of government. Questions formulated in a national
 
ministry were sent to each of the ten provincial governments. Here they
 
were reproduced and passed downward through each successive layer of
 
government to the smallest units, the officials of which assembled the
 
requested information in ways best suiting their judgment and convenience.
 
Compilations and recompilations of these data were then passed back
 
through the same channels to Seoul, where any opportunity to detect
 
errors and appraise the accuracy of the figures was absent.
 
1/ Surveys & Research Corporation has advocated the utilization
 
wherever possible of Japanese and other nearby facilities for training
 
Korean personnel as an alternative to sending them to the United States.
 
On behalf of this policy, it has pointed to the lesser costs and to the
 
value of training in environments similar to those in which the trainees
 
will work in their own country. In the case of Japan there is the
 
added advantage that Koreans of middle age and older customarily are
 
familiar with the Japanese language. A contract "service" (No. 15)
 
calling for the contractor to arrange training in the United States
 
for eight Korean technicians for three months "in methods of wiring
 
and in data processing machine operation" was amended at the contractor's
 
initiative to provide for such training in Japan or the Philippines.
 
Instead of eight trainees for three months in the United States,
 
twenty-six were sent to Tokyo for six weeks with results which are
 
believed to have been of at least equal value.
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A SAG report of November 21, 1960 11asserted:
 
"Habits of statistical compilation and graphic presentation
 
are deeply rooted in Korean governmental administration, but
 
they are largely the work of untrained personnel and are often
 
unaccompanied by understanding of the uses of statistics.
 
Literally hundreds of statistical reports may be demanded of
 
the officials of a single myon in a single year, precluding any

likelihood of usefulness from many of them. 
For those at higher

official levels who demand these reports they tend to be ritual­
istic, the 
source of colored diagrams to impress visitors. For
 
those who prepare the reports their preparation is often regarded
 
as a routine and onerous task, to be completed in the easiest
 
possible way with a minimum of effort. 
Conscientious officials
 
may have faith that the collection of statistics is in some way

useful; perhaps as a magical rite, unrelated to the real world
 
of cause and effect."
 
With Korea's statistical problems rooted so deeply in the 
sources
 
of its national data, the project director wished at the outset to
 
observe some of these at close hand. 
He decided upon a field trip
 
to the southern provinces of Kyongsang Pukto and Kyongsang Namdo during
 
the week of June 2 - 7, 1958. In its purposes and modes of travel the
 
trip was said by OEC to be without precedent and it required consider­
able cutting of red tape, in which the assistance of Mr. Frank G. O'Neill,
 
Deputy Chief of OEC's Public Administration Division, was invaluable.
 
Dr. Rice was accompanied by interpreter Cho, who carried and disbursed
 
an armful of bundles of 100 hwan notes (the largest denomination then
 
issued and each worth a few cents); by Deputy Director Chang, Yun Suk of
 
the Bureau of Statistics, the oldest in point of service of its responsibl
 
officials; and for a portion of the time by Mr. Lee, Chi Wu of that bureau,
 
1/ Better Statistics in Korea, page 11. 
 This was the first of the seven
 
published "interim" bilingual reports to the Government of the Republic

of Korea mentioned above in the preface. 
Among the forty-three units of
 
the ROK Government legally empowered to collect statistics, as reported

by SAG in January 1960 and listed in the appendix of the publication cited,
 
pages 45-49, some collect information of nonsurvey types to which the
 
present description would not apply.
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The purpose of the trip was to learn "at the grass roots" how
 
information requested by ministerial offices in Seoul was actually obtained
 
and channeled back to them. This required interviews at each "level" of
 
government with officials through whose hands ministerial requests for
 
information passed "downward" to the points of data collection; then
 
talks with those who made or controlled the collection; finally, a
 
pursuit of the routes by which compilations and recompilations of the
 
data reached the point of survey origin in Seoul.
 
The initial naive assumption that interviews and observations of
 
the required character could be made without warning in advance of
 
intended visits to officials concerned had soon to be abandoned, though
 
it was realized in a few minor instances. In general, the Ministry of
 
Home Affairs, with its firm control over provincial and local governments,
 
its political responsibilities to maintain the existing regime in power,
 
and an all-seeing eye upon everything that transpired in the nation, made
 
all arrangements. Within the limitations of its friendly solicitude, a
 
reasonably representative roster of officials in the two provinces was
 
interviewed. The list extended from their very hospitable governors,
 
through mayors and other chief officers of shis, eup, guns, and myons,
 
to the chiefs of a village li and an urban dong.
 
Notes taken during the week were amplified in a thirty-seven page
 
report distributed in Korea and Washington. The trip brought to light
 
much useful information concerning Korean statistical procedures,
 
especially at the points of initial collection and tabulation, and
 
disclosed numerous points of particular weakness. The "highlights,
 
points of interest and tentative conclusions" of the report have been
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modified by later, less hurried inquiry, directed at more limited and
 
specific questions of statistical collection. They were probably of less
 
importance than the precedent that was established for "grass roots"
 
investigation and field observation by members of the SAG.-'
 
Among the eighteen findings and conclusions of the report,
 
the first may be mentioned: "Data reporting at local levels must
 
utilize the existing structure of administration and control within
 
ward and dong offices in the cities and by gun, myon and li officers
 
in rural areas. Any national agency for administering a population
 
or agricultural census or obtaining vital statistics must use the
 
mechanisms that are now lodged within the Ministry of Home Affairs."
 
This conclusion was sharply at variance with the project director's
 
earlier hope for centralized control over nationwide censuses. 
It may
 
to some extent have reflected an influence upon his observations and
 
opinions subtly achieved by the official apparatus that took charge
 
of his tour. Future events, on the other hand, seemed to support the
 
necessity of at least a compromise with the traditional administrative
 
system. At the time it was reached the conclusion took account, realisti­
cally, of the tenacity of a system of intragovernmental relationships
 
that seemed unlikely to be modified in the interests of improved census
 
administration. Appraisals of the censuses when taken more than two
 
years later provided much reason to believe that "the existing structure
 
1/ During seven visits to Korea the project director eventually visited
 
all ten of the provinces which, including the Special City of Seoul,

make up the Republic. Most of the later trips were made at personal
 
expense under arrangements by the Royal Asiatic Society.
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of administration and control" at local levels was actually the heart
 
of census organization and administration, in spite of restrictions
 
theoretically placed upon them.
 
Another early field trip may be recorded here along with the
 
first. In July 1958, the group's efforts to perform one of the
 
broader contract "services" provided also an opportunity for an un­
announced visit to an important gun office.
 
The occasion was a week's seminar in administration at Onyang
 
Hot Springs for a number of Korea's foremos.: business leaders, arranged
 
by the Public Administration Division of OEC. The session for one full
 
day was allotted to SAG for discussion of the uses of governmental
 
statistics by business and the importance of good statistics to the
 
business world. Prepared papers with Korean translations were presented
 
as follows: "Practical Application of Statistics in Modern Business,"
 
by Herbert 0. Rogers; "Government Statistics and Business," by Lorand
 
Dabasi-Schweng; and "Cooperation between Business and Government in
 
Statistics," by Stuart A. Rice.
 
The return to Seoul by highway permitted an unannounced afternoon
 
stopover of some two hours at the office of a heavily populated gun midway
 
between Onyang and Seoul. Gun officials appeared for the most part to be
 
on the job. Their answers to questions asked were generally consistent
 
with those obtained a month earlier on the trip by the project director
 
to southern provinces.
 
On a large number of subsequent occasions, visits were made by SAG
 
members to shi and eup, and especially to gun, myon, ku, and dong offices,
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in connection with preparations for field work on the censuses; but
 
seldom if ever again without some prior advance arrangement.
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V
 
THE CENSUSES DEMAND ATTENTION
 
The analysis of contract objectives and the best means of serving
 
them, described in Chapter II, were not the precipitating factors in
 
what became a high concentration of attention by the Statistical
 
Advisory Group upon census problems. The subject was thrust upon
 
them at an early date.
 
The original members of the group had been in Seoul for only a few
 
weeks during the summer of 1958 when they received emissaries from the
 
Bank of Korea, carrying copies of voluminous plans for an agriculture
 
census, to be taken by the Bank at the request of the Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Forestry. These plans had been in preparation for
 
about a year. Nothing was known of them by the Bureau of Statistics
 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which had legal responsibilities for
 
census taking and was desultorily anticipating their exercise.
 
It was then discovered that the Ministry of Health and Social
 
Affairs, with less thoroughness than the Bank and without the knowledge
 
or assent of other ministries, was making preparations for a census of
 
housing. Apart from the somewhat ambiguous relations between the Ministry
 
of Agriculture and Forestry and the Bank of Korea, there was no evidence
 
of interministerial knowledge or responsibility regarding these various
 
census anticipations and preparations. Nor were there arrangements of
 
any kind for their coordination. The situation presented major issues
 
that could not be escaped.
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How could three separate sets of plans and anticipations for
 
national census taking be reconciled? When the Bureau of Statistics was
 
informed by the Statistical Advisory Group of the Bank of Korea's prepara.
 
tions for an agriculture census, the Bureau despatched low ranking
 
personnel to the Bank to obtain information about them. Information
 
was refused. For this refusal the Bank had plausible reasons: the
 
Bureau's status within the government and in the public eye was low,
 
and it feared the results if the Bureau should gain control of the
 
agriculture census. In addition, the Bank felt, the Bureau should have
 
sent representatives of higher rank.
 
As to the population census which the Bureau expected itself to
 
take, it appeared unaware of needs for advance preparations. Presumably
 
it planned to employ the traditional methods of conducting nationwide
 
inquiries, described above on page 24.
 
In its first consideration of the problem of coordination among
 
census plans, it seemed to the Statistical Advisory Group that a single
 
census embracing population, housing, and agriculture was required; and
 
a recommendation to this affect was discussed with various ministers
 
and ministerial officials. The recommendation was withdrawn when it
 
became apparent that the price of a single census administration would
 
be the abandonment of the progressive plan for central direction of the
 
agriculture census inherent in the program of the Bank of Korea. The
 
loss, it was felt, would more than counterbalance any gains. Moreover,
 
the consolidation of effort that supposedly would result from a single
 
census was not assured. The indicated alternative to a combined census
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was the creation of means whereby separate census inquiries could be made
 
consistent with and supplementary to each other.
 
Meetings between the project director and the Council of Ministers
 
and various ministerial officials led to the creation of the Census
 
Council, an interministerial body for which Korean governmental
 
traditions provided little if any precedent. With the Minister of
 
Home Affairs serving as Council Chairman, a staff was created under the
 
direction of Dr. "Ken" Tchah, an American-trained economist who held
 
important functions of program planning in the Ministry of Reconstruction,
 
The task of this staff was to coordinate the separate census activities
 
at a working level.
 
The Council was avowedly created in the hope that it might survive,
 
following completion of the census program, as an agency of coordination
 
for all statistical activities of the ROK Government. Amendment No. 4
 
of the ICA contract, in a change of wording, provided that the contractor's
 
"services" should be performed "in cooperation with the Korean Census
 
Council and other agencies" of the ROK Government.
 
However, built-in defects of organization, reluctantly accepted
 
by the advising statisticians as beyond their control, soon disclosed
 
an inevitable failure of the new body in its primary purposes. 
Though
 
supposedly interministerial, the Council was located within the Ministry
 
of Home Affairs, the most political of all the ministries, which housed
 
in its organization the Bureau of Statistics. 
The conception of an
 
interministerial staff, headed by an executive officer from another
 
ministry, was alien to Korean viewpoints. Members of the Council other
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than its Chairman made no effort to share in Council decisions, and the
 
post of Executive Secretary was presently seized by the Director of
 
the Bureau of Statistics under the sanction of a presidential decree that
 
amended the Council's organization. The change gave him two budgets
 
and payrolls, and a shadow authority that added a little to the
 
authority he had previously possessed.
 
Following the Military Revolution in May 1961, it became apparent
 
that the Census Council had become an impediment rather than an aid
 
to furtherance of census objectives, and consistent with a recommenda­
tion of the Statistical Advisory Group it was abolished.
 
By the time of the creation of the Census Council, and in large
 
part because of the inescapable direction of attention toward census
 
preparations by the Statistical Advisory Group, these had become the
 
chief preoccupation in the statistics field of the ROK Government,
 
the contractor, and the USOM itself. Mr. Ehrman's 1959 address to
 
the OEC staff, mentioned in Chapter II (page 10), dealt mainly with
 
the population, housing, and agriculture censuses -- an emphasis which
 
was generally approved by his audience. Preparations for these censuses
 
were by that time actively under way by all agencies concerned. Respond­
ing in part to the Advisory Group's hopes for improved organization,
 
the population and housing inquiries were combined under the Bureau of
 
Statistics, but responsibility for the agriculture census was returned
 
from the Bank of Korea to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
 
The zigzag record of census preparations during subsequent months
 
is partially set forth in sections of Chapter VI. Changes in the ROK
 
-34-

Government resulting from the "Student Revolution" of April 1960 brought
 
to positions of official responsibility for the censuses persons who
 
lacked familiarity with their origins, purposes, or concepts. During
 
his seven months in Korea in that year, the project director called
 
upon seven successive Ministers of Home Affairs in their ex officio
 
capacities as Chairmen of the Census Council. 
 It is doubtful if any
 
of them were very much aware, either before or after his call, of the
 
responsibilities of the position.
 
Subordinate personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
 
insisted upon the necessity of a two-month interval between the population­
housing and agriculture censuses. In the absence of competent over­
riding authority, the interval was conceded, together with postponement
 
of the dates scheduled for both. The succession of delays in construct­
ing a data processing building for census operations following the
 
enumerations is described in a section of Chapter VI.
 
Nor were the administrative changes affecting the censuses and
 
the work of SAG regarding them entirely within the ROK Government.
 
USOM's internal responsibilities for the statistics project were trans­
ferred from its Public Administration to its Program and Economic Policy
 
Division. This change accompanied increasing attention on both sides of
 
the aid relationship to economic planning. USOM was deeply concerned
 
with a number of statistical questions not directly related to the
 
censuses. 
As time went on it became the view of one USOM official that 
the censuses had become an obstacle to a needed reorientation of interest -­
"the tail wagging the dog." The basic need, in his view, was to improve 
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ROK capabilities to obtain economic statistics of narrower scope, upon
 
such subjects as gross national product, labor force, balance of pay­
ments, inventories, capital formation, and foreign trade.
 
A suggested solution was to assign each member of the Statistical
 
Advisory Group to a ministry or other agency of the government so
 
that it would be working in many more statistics fields. This sug­
gestion harked back to the discarded conception of "counterparts." It
 
was strenuously opposed by the contractor and his staff on the ground
 
that it would destroy the staff's effectiveness as a group, within
 
which functional division of labor was attempted and which, when held
 
together, had exhibited a capacity to exert an influence that would
 
be lost by its fragmentation.
 
Representatives of the contractor reiterated their belief in
 
the social and economic importance of reliable census information and
 
insisted that the investment of funds and effort already made in the
 
census required that it be "seen through to completion." This view
 
was supported by ICA officials in Washington. At the same time, the
 
contractor pointed to numerous instances of advice and assistance under
 
the contract to the improvement of economic statistics, starting at the
 
very outset of the work, together with expectations of further effort
 
in this direction.
 
Admittedly, some of these expectations had been disappointed,
 
partly because of instabilities in the ROK Government. Thus, at one
 
time, following the "May Revolution" of 1961, the Bureau of Statistics
 
was left without a Director, Acting Director, or Deputy Director and
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retained only one of its four section chiefs. In circumstances such
 
as these, the Statistical Advisory Group had provided whatever continuity
 
and stability remained in the work of the agency. Disappointments were
 
also due, in part, to the cutback in authorized field staff (see page 13).
 
These honest differences in the appraisal of contract objectives
 
and responsibilities tended to evaporate as the work and problems of
 
the Statistical Advisory Group became better understood. The censuses
 
were carried through to a creditable near-completion at the time the
 
contract expired; and simultaneously intensive attention was given to
 
such areas of .conomic statistics as foreign trade, prices, industrial
 
production, classification of industries and commodities, labor force,
 
employment, unemployment, gross national product, and "input-output"
 
or inter-industry relations. In addition, much time was devoted to
 
proposals for sample surveys and instruction of Korean personnel in
 
the methods thereof.
 
Some of the progress made in these various directions is described
 
in Chapter VIII.
 
-- 
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VI
 
THE KOREAN DATA PROCESSING CENTER
 
The data processing facilities of the Bureau of Statistics, Korea's
 
analogue of the United States Bureau of the Census, were 
inspected by the
 
first mombers of the contractor's field staff shortly after their arrival
 
in Seoul. They saw unforgettable congestion and disorder. 
A Quonset hut
 
was piled high with survey schedules. 
 In front of and intermingled with
 
them were antiquated and broken-down data processing machines. 
Some were
 
apparently left over from the Japanese period and only two or three
 
appeared relatively recent and in working order. 
The "repair shop" in 
the rear was equipped with simple hand tools of hammer and screwdriver 
variety. 
It was clear that neither these facilities nor the abacus -- still in 
general use for statistical tabulations and calculations 
-- would be ade­
quate for processing the returns of a national census. In compliance with
 
a "service" under the contract 
(No. 5), an American expert in data pro­
cessing equipment, Mr. Sidney Binder of National Analysts, Inc., 
was
 
engaged as a consultant and sent to Korea to review the problem. 
His
 
report / included a comprehensive evaluation of the existing equipment
 
available to the ROK Government, its methods and management; estimates
 
"Data Processing Equipment Needs of the Government of the Republic of
Korea," A Report to the Census Council by Surveys & Research Corporation,
Statistical Advisory Group, May 11, 
1959; 33 pages with 7 attachments.
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of machine needs for the proposed censuses; alternative means of satisfy­
ing these needs (including, for example, processing abroad); recommenda­
tions concerning machines, other equipment, training, technical assistance,
 
and space requirements; together with extensive cost estimates. Mr. Bindez
 
recommended the purchase and/or rental of "modern punched card processing
 
units of the International Business Machines Corporation."
 
In keeping with Mr. Binder's reasoning, rentals came to be generally
 
preferred by SAG and USOM because they would include maintenance, because
 
needs for machines would presumably decline following the census, and
 
because "it appears unwise to limit the growing national statistical
 
system to any present type of equipment."
 
IBM machines were believed by Mr. Binder to be "the most efficient
 
of available punched card systems for census work." The principal operat­
ing unit would be composed of five multi-purpose statistical tabulating
 
and sorting machines, "for which there is no direct counterpart for
 
speed, accuracy and efficiency in equipment of any other manufacture."
 
Other machines included in the system would be 76 punches, 45 verifiers,
 
16 sorters, 3 accumulating tabulators, 8 reproducers, 2 collators, and 8
 
summary punching machines. Mr. Binder believed that such a system would
 
represent the greatest advance in data processing technology that the
 
Republic of Korea would be able to utilize effectively at its then existing
 
stage of development.
 
In addition to training in the operation of such equipment, Mr. Binder
 
stressed the space requirements that would be needed for its operation.
 
"Characteristics of this space must include structural strength for heavy
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equipment, adequate electrical wiring, and appropriate levels of cleanli­
ness, humidity, and temperature," together with satisfactory illumination
 
and other facilities for a working staff of approximately 400 people. 
No
 
existing space available to the ROK Government met these specifications,
 
and the erection of a new building for data processing seemed the only
 
solution.
 
Agreements between ROK and USOM officials that made possible a formal
 
project agreement and provision of the required dollars and counterpart
 
funds for the purchase and rental cf data processing equipment were not
 
reached until March 1960. 
 The following month witnessed the overturn of
 
the Syngman Rhee Government in the so-called "April" or "Student
 
Revolution." 
 In June SAG reported that "all 1960 funds for census per­
sonnel, data processing equipment and construction have now been approved
 
by both USOM and the ROK Government." The machine equipment began arriv­
ing in March 1961, but the census enumerations and still another revolution
 
the military takeover in May of that year, were past history before a suit­
able place in which to use the equipment had been provided.
 
Until May 1960, the first census enumeration had been scheduled for
 
the following October. 
For a variety of budgetary and administrative
 
reasons 
and finally for reasons of expediency, this schedule was also de­
ferred. 
During the second half of 1960 the SAG and Korean administrative
 
officials impatiently awaited enactment by the General Assembly of a
 
"local autonomy law" under which elections were certain to absorb public
 
attention. Elections at the time of a census 
seemed equally certain to
 
impair its completeness and accuracy. 
At best, electioneering and census
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enumeration would be associated in the public mind, inasmuch as the same
 
community leaders in a large proportion of cases would be involved in
 
both. It was hoped that when the election dates had been determined,
 
census enumerations could be rescheduled to avoid conflict.
 
Although the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had insisted upon
 
a separate enumeration for the agriculture census (see Chapter V) and a
 
two-month interval between the two censuses had been agreed upon, these
 
arrangements became increasingly questionable. By September "continued
 
inaction" on the local autonomy bill by the Assembly, in SAG's opinion,
 
"made it increasingly evident that separate enumerations for population
 
and housing and for agriculture could not be held in 1960." Trial
 
censuses were conducted to test the feasibility of combining the two
 
enumerations and these indicated that from technical standpoints no loss
 
and even gain would result. Hence, SAG recommended to the Prime Minister
 
that a joint census be scheduled for December 1, and that the elections
 
be arranged to avoid conflict with that date. He thereupon announced
 
that "the 1960 census" would be taken on December 1, without clarifying
 
its scope.
 
Unyielding opposition by the Agriculture Ministry continued and
 
agreement was painfully reached to keep the December 1 date for the popu­
lation and housing census and set February 1, 1961, for the agriculture
 
enumeration. The local autonomy bill was finally passed in early Novem­
ber. It called for the first of several local elections on December 12.
 
By this time the census program had passed the point of no return and the
 
schedule last agreed upon was maintained. Although many deficiencies
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were subsequently found in the census enumerations, there is little evi­
dence to indicate that these were specifically caused by or enhanced by
 
the proximity of the elections, as had been feared.
 
Before census schedules began arriving from the field, it had long
 
been evident that no acceptable place would be available in which to
 
receive and process them. 
Delays in the construction of a "census" or
 
"data processing building" had been persistent. Agreement upon a site
 
for the building seemed unattainable.
 
In January 1960, a "site, plans and construction schedules" were
 
being "reviewed" by SAG. 
In March "a number of prospective site loca­
tions ... were studied." 
 In May, "with the release of counterpart funds
 
for construction," 
the Minister of Home Affairs "initiated action" to
 
secure approval of the construction site "that he has proposed." 
 In
 
June he announced that the site "is now available." In July "land for
 
the new census building was formally made available." Agreement was
 
reached on its general design. In August, architect's plans were drawn
 
and reviewed. 
In October, invitations to bid on construction were
 
announced. 
 In November a "snag" was encountered in the form of two
 
substantial concrete buildings hastily erected by squatters on the
 
census building site. Legal action was being taken to evict them. /
 
At the beginning of January construction was proceeding "with completion
 
I/ 
At one time, as shown in photographs, workers were engaged in con­
struction at one end of the larger building while simultaneously other
 
workers were engaged in its demolition at the other end.
 
scheduled" for the following July 31. The building was finally occupied
 
by the Bureau of Statistics in November 1961, more than a year after the
 
time at which the censuses, as originally scheduled, should have com­
pleted field enumerations.l/
 
Members of SAG were invited to witness the filing and opening of
 
bids by Korean firms for the construction of the data processing building
 
and tLue award of a contract. These procedures seemed to offer another
 
illustration of differences between Western and Oriental attitudes and
 
conceptions. They are cited in SAG reports as "fantastic" from the
 
standpoint of the first in respect to equity and guarantee of performance.
 
They were described as conforming to Korean law and intended to prevent
 
an award to either the lowest or the highest bidder. Apparently as a
 
result, bids were concentrated around central if not identical figures.
 
By an inscrutable process the selection of Lhe successful bidder was said
 
to result from "pure chance."
 
When the possibility of completing the data processing building in
 
time to receive census schedules on their arrival in Seoul was seen to
 
be nonexistent, a search for alternatives was for a long time fruitless.
 
SAG felt compelled by circumstances to take initiatives in this and related
 
matters that more properly belonged to ROK authorities. Choice lay between
 
such initiatives and collapse of the census program. The absence of stable
 
and competent authority at high levels was constantly illustrated.
 
1/ The requirements for the building's construction and equipment, as Mr.
 
Binder had specified them, provided many unusual problems. Thus, "adequate
 
electrical wiring" presupposed a dependable supply of electric power that the
 
city lines could not furnish and resort to specially installed generators
 
became necessary.
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Eventually the group arranged for minimum repairs in the east
 
wing of the second floor of the Japanese-built Capitol Building,
 
which had long remained in a bombed and burned-out state by decision
 
of Syngman Rhee as a souvenir of enmities. Thus began a process of
 
building renovation that continued during the next two years.
 
Repairs for census purposes began in December 1960. Here, in early
 
winter, minus plumbing and heating and with dim illumination, bundles
 
of census schedules, held back for a time in gun offices, were
 
received and checked. By February, editing of schedules in the
 
same quarters had begun.
 
Data processing equipment, meanwhile, had also in part been
 
held back from shipment. Repairs on the third floor of the Capitol
 
Building to receive it reached the stage of specifications and cost
 
estimates in February. In March "a substantial shipment" of the
 
equipment arri.ved in Korea, but the space intended for its reception
 
had not yet been prepared. 
 In April it still awaited "the clearance
 
of funds for the repair," and in May, the month of the military coup,
 
the situation remained unchanged. On June 15, Mr. Fairley, data pro­
cessing advisor in SAG, discovered a considerable quantity of this
 
equipment in the open air on the docks at Inchon with some crates
 
broken open. 
In the same month, funds were released for the Old
 
Capitol Building repairs and a contract let for completion of the work
 
by July 15. Meanwhile, as reported at the end of June, "nearly all
 
of the equipment, both leased and purchased, is now inwarehouse
 
storage in Seoul."
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In its May 1961 report, SAG notes that two weeks after the military
 
coup, on May 31, the Bureau of Statistics was "moved to the west wing
 
of the Old Capitol, by order of the Minister of Home Affairs. The
 
space is quite unsuited to the purpose." Moreover, "the severe drop"
 
in the morale of its staff was "particularly noticeable." By August
 
the Bureau was "in a very bad state of disorganization," without a
 
Director or Deputy Director and left with but one of its four section
 
chiefs. The data processing equipment which had been in storage was
 
moved approximately on schedule to the space prepared for it in the
 
Old Capitol Building; but it cannot be surprising that most of the
 
supervision over its use was supplied by personnel of the SAG and by
 
representatives of IBM who came from Tokyo to assist in the installa­
tion. The equipment remained in the Old Capitol for less than half a
 
year until its removal to the new building of the Data Processing Center.
 
When it had been completed and occupied, the Korean Data Process­
ing Center immediately became a source of pride to the Korean Government
 
and a showplace. To its statistical advisors a latent question immediately
 
became acute: *ow far would these data processing facilities be available
 
to all official agencies of the Republic and to other organizations? SAG
 
had been partially successful in discouraging the use of the name "census
 
building," which connoted a limited use, but the center was still identi­
fied in the public and official minds with a single bureau. "The right of
 
access to the Center's facilities by other government agencies on a basis
 
of equality with the Bureau of Statistics"l-/ has been a cardinal.
 
iL/ Better Statistics in Korea, page 22.
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element in the SAG's hope for the development of such interrelationships
 
among Korean statistical agencies and their activities as would justify
 
the use of the term "Korean Statistical System."
 
A progressive indication in this direction was 
the issuance by the
 
Economic Planning Board in February 1963 of Ordinance No. 15 which governs
 
the conditions under which the Bureau of Research and Statistics can pro­
vide data processing services for other agencies. 
The SAG has found this
 
regulation less than satisfactory in a number of particulars, and at the
 
request of the Bureau's Director has prepared recommendations to strengthen
 
the facility as a mechanism of statistical coordination. Nevertheless, the
 
rigid shell of bureaucratic monopoly over a utility which should serve
 
"the government as a whole" has been broken. 
Rented equipment has already
 
to a considerable degree been returned, but the ROK Government now has 
one
 
of the best equipped data processing installations in the Far East, with a
 
potential stimulus to overall statistical, economic, and general science
 
development that should continue to be realized for years to come.
 
The maintenance hitherto given equipment at the Center by the IBM
 
Corporation under rental arrangements is expiring with them, and Korean
 
personnel have been sent to Tokyo for training in preparation for their
 
assumption of maintenance responsibilities for the purchased machines
 
that remain.
 
As the Korea statistics project comes to an end, negotiations are
 
still in process among the American-Korean Foundation, Surveys & Research
 
Corporation, the IBM World Trade Corporation, and the ROK Government con­
cerning a 
proposal of the first two that the third contribute a 650
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computer system to the Korean nation for exclusively educational and
 
research purposes. According to the proposal, this new equipment
 
would be installed in the Data Processing Center, where ancillary
 
facilities would be available, but would not be used for routine
 
statistical or administrative purposes. It would remain under
 
Foundation control and provide a laboratory site for courses in data
 
processing machine operations by Korean universities, as well as
 
facilities for the furtherance of research projects, whether by
 
faculty and students at these universities or by government agencies.
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VII 
CENSUSES ARE NEARING COMPLETION
 
It is doubtful if any country in modern times has completed a
 
comprehensive national census program in the face of the vicissi­
tudes which confronted the censuses of the Republic of Korea. 
Work
 
on preparations and later work on data processing continued during
 
three mutually hostile political regimes separated by two major and
 
violent revolutions, each resulting in a well-nigh complete turnover
 
in government administration. Continuity was provided largely by
 
the Statistical Advisory Group of Surveys & Research Corporation,
 
without which, if.censuses had been undertaken at all, the results
 
would probably never have become available. The Korea statistics
 
project terminated on May 31, 1963, at which time the population and
 
housing census of December 1, 1960, and the agriculture census of
 
February 1, 1961, wOre near completion.
 
From the beginning of its work, the Statistical Advisory Group
 
took the position that reliable census data provide the foundation for
 
a sound statistical system. 
One of its earliest tasks in 1958, before
 
the creation of the Census Council that it recommended, was to draft
 
tentative plans for conducting population, housing, and agriculture
 
censuses in 1960. 
 This in itself was a departure from the tacit assump­
tion of Korea's census taking agency, the Bureau of Statistics, that a
 
census required little if any preparation. Fortunately, this view,
 
had not been held by the research staff of the Bank of Korea, and an
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important motivation of SAG was to insure utilization of its plans
 
for a census of agriculture, for which Korea had had no previous
 
experience.
 
Following long negotiations, a presidential decree creating a
 
Census Council was signed and became effective on February 10, 1959.
 
Shortly before, SAG's chief of party, Mr. Rogers, reported that
 
"even after the decree becomes effective it will be seriously handi­
capped by the fact that no budgetary provisions have been made for
 
census activities in 1959, no office space has been provided for
 
housing the secretariat, and no staff appointed."
 
"In order to provide the Council with some funds on which to
 
operate" arrangements were made by SAG, in cooperation with the Public
 
Administration Division of USOM, for the release to the Council of
 
the equivalent of approximately $180,000 in counterpart funds.
 
Early decisions reached by the Census Council and its secretariat
 
in the spring of 1959 conformed in the main to SAG recommendations. It
 
was agreed, as previsioned by the project director in his early field
 
trip (pages 25-27 above), that the services of provincial government
 
agencies must be utilized, at least in the census of population and
 
housing, but with correction so far as possible of deficiencies in the
 
traditional methods of enumeration by adequate training of enumerators.
 
By the middle of 1959 the censuses were continuing to receive the
 
"major share of the attention" of the SAG, and the drafting and review
 
of questions for census schedules (a time consuming preliminary process)
 
had progressed to the point that first field tests were being scheduled.
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Census training film strips and accompanying recordings borrowed from
 
the United States Bureau of the Census were translated into the Korean
 
language and given preliminary showings to ROK and USOM officials.
 
During the following quarter, field work by Mr. Lawrence and Dr.
 
Schweng in southern rural areas and in Seoul was pointed at the train­
ing of enumerators and at tests of preliminary census schedules. 
The
 
annexation of the Census Council by the Ministry of Home Affairs (see
 
page 84) and the repatriation of responsibility for the agriculture
 
census by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry gave particular
 
concern to SAG. 
 In regard to the second, the Minister of Agriculture
 
and Forestry and the Governors of the Bank of Korea and the Agricultural
 
Bank gave SAG assurances of mutual cooperation.
 
These assurances became more specific later in the year with
 
agreements reached upon an administrative structure for field operations,
 
the selection of enumerators for the agriculture census who had acquired
 
training and experience in the population and housing census, and the
 
detail of personnel from the two banks for planning, training, and super­
visory functions in the agriculture census.
 
In addition, the Ministers of Defense and Justice agreed with the
 
Minister of Home Affairs on their respective roles in the collection of
 
population data for special groups under their charge, such as military
 
personnel and prisoners. 
A joint meeting of central government officials
 
and personnel from provincial governments who would be responsible in the
 
field was held in Seoul. The National Assembly approved a 1960 budget
 
for census purposes of about 1.5 billion hwan, one third from regular funds
 
and two thirds from counterpart sources.
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During the first quarter of 1960, field tests continued, budgets
 
and program were reexamined and revised, and training programs were put
 
in operation. A sample post enumeration survey to test the quality and
 
coverage of enumeration was designed, together with a punch card for
 
the population and housing tabulations.
 
The disruptive effects of the Student Revolution in April 1960
 
upon the census program are not fully disclosed in SAG reports. They
 
are reflected in (see Chapter VI) the almost interminable delays in
 
the construction and occupancy of the data processing building.
 
SAG's four-month report on August 30 states laconically: "Each
 
of the three ministries concerned with the 1960 census participated in
 
the reshuffling of personnel which was an aftermath of the April
 
Revolution. Since none of the new chiefs who were assigned to
 
sections concerned with the census had any statistical experience, need
 
for the advice of the Statistical Advisory Group has increased."
 
In retrospect it appears probable that paralyzing tensions had
 
been building up within the ROK governmental mechanisms for some time
 
prior to the April Revolution, unper.eived to American observers. In
 
any event, approval by the Combined Economic Board for the release of
 
counterpart funds to cover census costs during the first half of the
 
calendar year 1960 did not occur until late in Hay. Thus, fiscal stale­
mate supplemented political uncertainties. The almost agonizing recogni­
tior. as the summer advanced that "the impending local elections would
 
require a postponement of the population and housing census" has
 
been related above (pages 39-40).
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"Actually /i's viewed by SAG at the quarter's ending on November
 
30 of the census year7 the census program had been set back several
 
months by the reorganizations and changes which followed the April
 
Revolution, and, irrespective of the election issue, a deferment of
 
the census date would probably have been necessary." However,
 
"deferment ... beyond December 1 threatened to eliminate it /.he 
census/ entirely." With many of the essential requirements still un­
provided, SAG announced in its November report, "the census will be
 
taken on December I ... with the enumerators strictly enjoined against
 
any form of political activity."
 
A variety oi budget, fiscal, and space problems remained unre­
solved. SAG was called upon to approve a revision of the joint USOM -

ROK census budget to release counterpart funds for the second half of
 
1960. In SAG's opinion, savings which resulted from deferred data
 
processing machine funds and allocations for the printing of census
 
schedules should be earmarked for temporary quarters pending completion
 
of the data processing building, but the Bureau of Statistics absorbed
 
these funds into its own operating budget to pay a sizable number of
 
employees whose services were not needed. 
On a brighter side, the
 
printing of schedules for the population and housing enumeration, 5.5
 
million in number, was satisfactorily completed in ten days by one of the
 
larger printing companies in Seoul, thus vindicating the belief that they
 
could be produced locally rather than in Japan or Hong Kong, as 
the con­
tract permitted and as had originally been intended.
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As public and official interest in the census mounted, suggestionf
 
which at any earlier stage would have been welcome tended to become
 
troublesome. Thus, after the agriculture census schedule was in final
 
form, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry made promises to the
 
General Assembly that 
an inquiry on the extent of farm indebtedness
 
would be included in it. The desire for information which led to his
 
promises was placated by the hastily devised SAG recommendation that
 
the desired inquiry be appended as a supplement to a one-percent
 
sample of farms. A sample plan and schedule were worked out in time
 
to be included in the training of all agriculture census personnel.
 
A probable source of considerable error in Korean agricultural
 
information was the fact that land 
areas had never been rechecked sub­
sequent to measurements made by Japanese occupying authorities many
 
years earlier. As part of the post enumeration survey, plans for a
 
land measurement phase took form during the last weeks of 1960
 
together with efforts to find the necessary funds. Tests of the
 
enumeration phase of this supplementary census were made early in the
 
new year and the training of 120 enumerators for the purpose began on
 
February 27, 1961, with enumeration to begin on March 5.
 
Once again census operations .-- in this case the begiinings of the 
data processing -. r werj interrupted by a-revolution., A SAG report of 
May 31 begins: "The military coup d'etat of May 16, 1961, has made it 
difficult to forecast the activities of the Statistical Advisory Group. 
Some activities begun before that date have definitely been abandoned,
 
and the state of others is uncertain."
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The post enumeration survey indicated that the quality of the
 
census enumerations had been extremely variable. Redoing of some
 
enumerations was indicated but was not attempted "because of the
 
absence of funds." For the same reason the hoped-for objective land
 
measurements could not be undertaken. 
Enumeration districts from
 
the population and housing census were reviewed to determine the
 
extent of non-response on each of the questionnaire items and a
 
plan was adopted to return to the field those which were in greatest
 
need of correction. This plan also was suspended "for lack of money
 
for postage and envelopes." At the end of May, "almost 40 IBM
 
machines, delivered in March, are still in their shipping crates
 
awaiting the clearance of funds" for the repair of space for their
 
temporary installation in the Old Capitol Building (see page 43).
 
As a consequence of delays in making space available and im­
plementing a recruitment program, the training of clerks and punch
 
operators for the census of population and housing did not begin
 
until July. The subsequent recruitment schedule was also disrupted
 
by administrative confusion in the Bureau of Statistics, so that the
 
processing staff was completed only in September.
 
Once recruited, punch card operators and verifiers learned their
 
jobs quickly and production rates were soon high with error rates low.
 
In almost every other respect, however, the work was slovenly as a
 
result of poor supervision and an apparent lack of a feeling of
 
responsibility for the whole job on the part of the supervisory
 
staff.
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Failures in tabulation programs were traceable to simple
 
problems of "housekeeping," which might have been cured by a degree
 
of work discipline that did not exist in the tabulation section.
 
Its newly appointed chief, to enjoy the dignity of his position,
 
removed his own desk as far away as possible from the section's
 
operations. At the end of 1961, "the continued discussions between
 
the Statistical Advisory Group and the management of the Bureau of
 
Statistics had resulted in no appreciable improvement."
 
Processing of the census of agriculture was extremely late in
 
getting started. Specifications for editing, coding, and tabulating
 
were slow in coming from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
 
which was responsible for providing them. This failure arose prin­
cipally from the instability of the research and statistics section
 
in that Ministry, where there was frequent turnover of personnel,
 
with responsibility for the census being passed from man to man,
 
each of whom had to learn anew. Actual editing of the agriculture
 
schedules did not begin until December 1961.
 
During much of the remaining seventeen months of the contract
 
period, Messrs. Fairley and Israel were assigned practically full­
time to the Bureau of Statistics, where they were compelled to com­
pensate, so far as could be done within their advisory roles, for the
 
Bureau's managerial deficiencies respecting data processing.
 
Early in 1962 it became clear that the Bureau of Statistics could
 
not complete the planned tabulation program with the resources that had
 
been allotted. At the beginning of that year,about 55 percent of the
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punching on the population-housing census had been completed. Six
 
months later the figure had been raised to 85 percent, with only 10
 
percent of the tabulations completed. Punching for the census of agri­
culture, beginning in January 1962, was about 50 percent completed at
 
the end of June with tabulations barely begun. Governmental dis­
organization and delays in the installation of data procev3ing machines
 
were having their effects upon the production of a very perishable
 
commodity -- statistical information.
 
At this time, the Statistical Advisory Group recommended the
 
preparation of advanced small sample tabulations for both censuses;
 
and the recommendation was accepted. The resulting publication of census
 
data appeared approximately a year before the results of the more
 
complete tabulations will be available.
 
In March 1962 the group proposed a curtailment in the main program
 
of tabulation for the population and housingcensus. Under this cur­
tailment many of the statistics would be based upon a 20-percent
 
sample of the returns. This proposal was also accepted about a month
 
later. With constant prodding and advice from Messrs. Fairley and
 
Israel, the operations of the tabulation section of the Bureau of
 
Statistics have gradually improved and the revised main schedule of
 
census tabulations is expected to be completed for the population and
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housing census in the summer of 1963 and for the agriculture census
 
1/
 
in the following fall or winter.-

The sentiments of those who have been involved in the five-year
 
struggle to organize and complete the basic statistical foundations for
 
the Republic of Korea which censuses provide are analogous to those of
 
sailors on a storm-wracked ship as it enters harbor mouth. No census
 
yet taken at any time or place, including those of recent decades in
 
the United States, has been without serious problems and deficiencies,
 
best known to those responsible for their administration. These were
 
greatly magnified in the first two censuses of a comprehensive and
 
truly scientific character ever conducted by a government in Korea.
 
Notwithstanding all of the tribulations by which they have been beset,
 
and in spite of their defects, the final products promise to warrant
 
the characterization "satisfactory." They will provide innumerable
 
"base lines" and "bench marks" from which future economic development
 
in the Republic of Korea can be charted and measured.
 
1/ Readers should not assume that curtailment of the original plans for
 
tabulations represented a major setback in the census program. More un­
fortunate than curtailment of some items to a 20-percent basis was the
 
delay in completing and publishing important results. A selection of
 
what is to be tabulated and cross-tabulated, perhaps on sample bases,
 
is always necessary in a census. In this connection, a former chief
 
statistician of the Population Division of the United States Bureau of
 
the Jensus once estimated that only one fifth of the usable results of a
 
census of population in this country is usually tabulated and made avail­
able to users.
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VIII
 
SERVICES RELATED TO CURRENT STATISTICS
 
Korean statistics as figures are abundant; the agencies producing
 
them numerous. SAG's interim report entitled Statistical Publications
 
in Korea, published July 5, 1961, itemizes fifty-two periodic sta­
tistical reports issued by thirty-one governmental and quasi­
governmental agencies. The Statistical Yearbook for 1961, published
 
by the Bureau of Statistics, lists 447 tables upon such diverse topics
 
as climate, population, military affairs, publication and translation
 
of books, and many other geophysical, cultural, and economic subjects.
 
No transient group of advisors could be cognizant of the character­
istics, uses, merits, and deficiencies of more than a small portion
 
of these reports and tables, or of the operations that have produced
 
them.
 
In this chapter specific reference is made to a limited number of
 
the more important statistical series with which the Statistical
 
Advisory Group has been actively concerned, but the influence of SAG's
 
work undoubtedly has extended much farther than the series mentioned
 
will indicate.
 
1/ Some of the material in this chapter repeats descriptions and
 
apprAisals of statistical series contained in a letter of April 30, 1962,
 
from Stuart A. Rice to Mr. Seymour Janow, Assistant Administrator for
 
the Far East of the Agency for International Development.
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For example, SAG can claim large credit for the present general
 
recognition of sampling as the quickest, most accurate, and least costly
 
method of obtaining many types of information. Sample surveys are being
 
planned in many quarters. Much of this recognition results from SAG's
 
fourth publication, A Sample Survey Service in Korea, the work of its
 
consultant Mr. J. Arnold King.
 
The improved execution of Korean sample surveys is due largely
 
to the unrelenting insistence at every opportunity by Dr. Benjamin J.
 
Tepping and Mr. Harold Israel that scientific standards in planning
 
and conducting them and in analyzing their results must be observed.
 
Their educational efforts in this respect have been in the Mark Hopkins
 
traditionI/ and have deeply affected the consciousness of many young
 
Koreans who are inheriting statistical responsibilities from elder
 
predecessors.
 
It is doubtful whether five years ago more than a handful of Koreans
 
could have been found in the ROK Government who understood the meaning,
 
let alone the importance, of such conceptions as sample design, selection
 
of strata, or estimation of variance and errors.
 
Again, much improvement has apparently resulted from the adoption
 
of recommendations made by Mr. James S. Fitzgerald, a consultant member
 
of SAG, in its Statistical Publications in Korea; but the influence of
 
this report undoubtedly will be wider than any record of adopted recom­
mendations.
 
1/ Hopkins on one end of the log, a student on the other.
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Of the statistical series described below, several are produced
 
by the Bank of Korea, a pseudo-governmental organization. The Bank has
 
long been reputed as the most competent and reliable statistical organi­
zation in the country, producing series having special economic import­
ance. Its economic data are derived for the most part by combining
 
data originally compiled by other ROK organizations.
 
Index of Industrial Production
 
When the Statistical Advisory Group first arrived in Korea in
 
1958, responsibilities for current industrial production statistics were
 
found primarily in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Methods of
 
reporting were highly irregular. Some figurefi reached Seoul through
 
the myon-gun-provincial channels already described (page 24). Others
 
were obtained from industrial and trade organizations, usually without
 
checks upon the completeness or consistency of the coverage of individual
 
establishments. It was unclear how such figures from separate sources
 
were combined. In August 1958, a series of meetings was held by the sta­
tistical advisors with section heads responsible for the collection and
 
publication of industry figures. Recommendations were made for improve­
ments in industry classification and groupings as well as table headings
 
in publications. These recommendations were accepted and incorporated
 
in subsequent publications.
 
In the same year the Bank of Korea began publication of its Monthly
 
Index of Industrial Production. On August 28, Mr. Lee, In Kon of the
 
Bank's research department, recently returned from training in the
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United States as a "participant," called upon the statistical advisors
 
to discuss the shortcomings of the industrial production statistics of
 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and obtain advice concerning the
 
index. Conferences with Bank personnel continued. During September
 
a total of fourteen meetings was held with its representatives, and
 
eleven meetings (including some of the fourteen) were held with various
 
public agencies upon questions directly related to the improvement of
 
the index and the data entering into it.
 
At the latest examination by Dr. Gabriel F. Cazell, economic sta­
tistics advisor of SAG, the index incorporated 149 commodity series,
 
based mainly on physical production, weighted by value added as measured
 
by the 1958 census of mining and manufacturing taken by the Korean
 
Reconstruction Bank. Despite great improvement since 1958, but
 
because of weaknesses in the industry classification and the arbitrary
 
assignment to some commodities of weights derived from the entire two­
digit categories with which they were classed, the weights at best were
 
extreme approximations. This was largely beyond the direct control of
 
the Bank. Moreover, the major sources of error were probably still in
 
the commodity series themselves. Some series had been discontinued
 
since the May 1961 Revolution and numerous important commodities were
 
not represented at all. Much of Korean "manufacturing" -- perhaps one
 
third -- consists of repairs, which were not directly represented in the
 
index. Dr. Cazell believed that "too much economic activity in manu­
facturing is excluded for the index to reflect accurately industrial
 
production."
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Index of Wholesale Prices
 
In 1955 this index, previously confined by the Bank of Korea to
 
the city of Seoul, was extended to other cities in which it has branch
 
offices. It was enlarged in composition from forty-five to nearly
 
200 items. In August 1958, at the request of the research department
 
of the Bank, the Statistical Advisory Group undertook a detailed
 
examination of the methods used in developing the revised index. Its
 
advice was sought particularly concerning a method of relating the
 
new index, with its larger number of items but extending backward only
 
to 1955, to the older index which went back to 1946. A comprehensive
 
memorandum presenting the group's views and suggestions was prepared.
 
A SAG monograph by Dr. Cazell, The Korean Wholesale Price Index,
 
was published on March 1, 1962. It points out that this important
 
series is still basically a Seoul index. Prices are collected thrice
 
monthly (for grains every five days) by six canvassers in Seoul and
 
one from each Bank of Korea branch office. Weaknesses in weighting
 
prices are analogous to those in weighting production, mentioned above.
 
Changes in the prices of 200 items can scarcely be "representative" of
 
general price movements. For example, the prices of preserved fish,
 
which are included, cannot accurately represent the prices of fresh
 
fish, which are excluded. All machinery, both electrical and nonelectrical,
 
is "represented" by seven machines plus a few components. Selections of
 
prices for inclusion depend largely on their availability. Seasonal items,
 
some of great national importance but having little place in wholesale
 
markets (for example, vegetables at kimchi making season), are omitted.
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Prices quoted at the first stage of the wholesale market, when it exists,
 
rather than prices actually paid by the retailer in a country accustomed
 
to bargaining at all levels of distribution, result in "price statistics"
 
which at best are of questionable accuracy or value for economic planning.
 
Index of Consumer Prices in Seoul
 
Several years of preparatory work by the Bank of Korea preceded
 
the continuous monthly publication of this index since September 1957.
 
More attention to the data utilized in compiling it has been given by
 
the Statistical Advisory Group during the latter months of its service
 
than at its beginning. As recently as March 1963 the sample for a
 
family living survey, described in the next paragraph, was redesigned
 
by the Bureau of Statistics with the group's assistar-e and may have value
 
for the revision of weights in the consumer price index. In addition,
 
the group has assisted the Bureau of Statistics to design specifications
 
for a monthly sample survey of family expenditures which should have
 
value for the same purpose.
 
The choice of commodities still rests essentially, however, upon
 
a few small consurter expenditure surveys, the most important being for
 
200 middle-class families of above-average incomes in 1953-55. The
 
weights, initially unrepresentative, had by 1962 become quite obsolete.
 
For the country at large, food was undoubtedly underweighted at 48 percent,
 
while such items as rent (11 percent) and clothing (13 percent) were
 
undoubtedly overweighted with respect to the rural population. Most
 
seasonal items, as with the wholesale price index, were omitted. More­
over, improbable stabilities among the prices reported, especially in
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view of the universality of bargaining, cast doubt upon the technique4
 
of collecting prices. 
Again, there seemed to be little adaptation
 
to changes in consumer preierences.
 
The Family Living Survey
 
By mid-1962, this comparatively new and ambitious survey, mention
 
in the paragraph above, covered eight quarters of published data for
 
Seoul and two quarters for "all cities." It follows the general recom
 
mendations of the International Labor Office. 
It is based on the
 
sophisticated scheme that total family receipts must equal total famil
 
disbursements. Its overcomplexity and elaboration of detail result in
 
some errors of estimate which are probably of several hundred percent
 
magnitude, since the number of families in some of the cells of the
 
table may be as few as 
three to five. Data are collected by a part­
time staff of college girls who leave with families "accounting diariei
 
for food expenditures and who require about one and one-half hours per
 
interview. Dr. Cazell believed that some reliance could be put in the
 
annual (but not the quarterly) figures as indicators of the average
 
income of employed families in Seoul.
 
Foreign Trade Statistics
 
The gaps and inaccuracies in the data assembled on foreign trade
 
were of concern to both governments from the outset of American economi
 
assistance to Korea. 
In 1958 import data covered only commodities
 
purchased with Korean foreign exchange and omitted all foreign aid
 
goods. 
A SAG report at the end of 1958 noted the "active part" taken
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by the Statistical Advisory Group "in bringing to the attention of the
 
appropriate ROK authorities the deficiencies of the foreign trade
 
statistics .... Arrangements have recently been made between the
 
Bureau of Customs and the Bank of Korea for complete coverage in the
 
future." Again, "the Customs Bureau has made the necessary arrange­
ments for establishing an effective method of collecting data that
 
will furnish a complete record of commodity imports by the ROK."
 
These predictions turned out to be unduly optimistic. It was
 
not until nearly three years later, when a comprehensive program of
 
foreign trade statistics had been developed by the SAG consultant
 
Dr. J. Edward Ely, who was Chief of the Foreign Trade Division
 
of the United States Bureau of the Census, that substantial improve­
ment seemed actually in sight.
 
SAG's fifth published report, Korean Import and Export Statistics,
 
contains Dr. Ely's findings and proposals and sets forth a compre­
hensive program which was designed to satisfy the basic needs for
 
quick, accurate, and approximately complete foreign trade data.
 
Mr. Scott V. Fairley, data processing advisor of SAG, assisted by
 
planning a conversion from manual to punch card procedures.
 
Responsibilities for foreign trade data within the ROK Government
 
had been mainly divided among the Bureau of Customs, the Bank of Korea,
 
and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. At an inter-agency meeting
 
on November 16, 1961, to take action on Dr. Ely's recommendations, it
 
was agreed that the Bank of Korea should provide overall direction of
 
an import and export statistics program. This promised to give effect
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to Dr. Ely's first recommendation that authorities and responsibilitiE
 
for the program be centralized.
 
Other needs to which the Ely report pointed included: (2) Improv
 
coverage of import statistics (e.g., imports by the ROK Office of
 
Supply had not been included in trade statistics); (3) Separate
 
data on imports under various programs (e.g., development projects,
 
the exchange control program, various aid programs); (4) A commodity
 
classification system in conformity with international classification;
 
(5) Uae of punch card procedures for tabulation; (6)Speedier import
 
coverage (statistics frequently included goods which actually arrived
 
in earlier periods).
 
Unfortunately, the failure of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
 
to continue its cooperation before the plan was perfected halted its
 
development and led later to a transfer of responsibility from the
 
Bank of Korea to the Statistical Council, newly established by the
 
Economic Planning Board under the Statistics Law. Here the program's
 
further development is a responsibility of a subcommittee. Although
 
not yet operational, the essentials of Dr. Ely's plan have remained
 
intact. The hope seems justified that further time will bring its
 
effectuation.
 
Gross National Product
 
Little if any time was devoted by the Statistical Advisory Group
 
to an examination of the validity of estimates by the Bank of Korea
 
of the Republic's gross national product until the arrival on its
 
staff of Dr. Cazell on June 16, 1961. He promptly began a study -- in
 
most cases a restudy -- of the Bank's economic series. 
This resulted
 
in a mimeographed but never published Report on Economic Indicators
 
in Korea.
 
InFebruary and March 1962, Dr. Cazell examined the Bank's
 
methods of compiling gross national income figures, including an
 
investigation of the reliability of data sources, imputation techniques,
 
methodology for the adjustment of income totals for each economic
 
sector and methods for the distribution of income. From these he
 
later proceeded to an analysis of national account worksheets.
 
Dr. Cazell's report on gross national product went through a
 
number of drafts, the last completed in July 1962. Although made
 
available to persons in 
a position to use his findings, the report
 
was still regarded as tentative and remained unpublished at the time
 
its author returned to the United States. 
 The report revealed especially
 
gross deficiencies in the basic data from the sectors of agriculture,
 
manufacturing, and retail and wholesale trade. 
This was damaging to
 
the gross national product estimates, since the reliability of the
 
aggregate depends upon the reliability of the major components.
 
Economic Activity of the Population
 
One of the earliest subjects to receive attention from the
 
Statiatical Advisory Group in 1958 was the labor force survey con­
ducted by the Bureau of Statistics. Recommendations, intended to
 
enhance its usefulness, called for its conversion into a 
monthly
 
canvass of employment in the establishments of approximately 200 non­
agricultural firms and government agencies. 
It was thought possible in
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this way to obtain data on employment and payrolls for about one third
 
of the workers in nonagricultural pursuits.
 
These recommendations 
-- good as far as they went -- did not meet
 
all of the wishes for information by ROK and USOM officials. The
 
Bureau of Statistics continued its work along traditional lines
 
which embodied conceptions borrowed from the labor force survey of
 
the United States. This was unrealistic because industrial structure
 
and employment relationships differ so vastly in the two countries.
 
Interest in the problem again became acute as a result of
 
difficulties of interpretation that arose in the economic activities
 
section of the 1960 census of population. These led to the group's
 
seventh published report, Economic Activity Concepts, prepared by
 
Mr. David Yentis. The foreword pointed to "the urgent need for an
 
examination of the concepts, definitions and procedures involved in
 
obtaining such information." When Mr. Yentis completed his service,
 
Mr. Collis Stocking, of the President's Council of Economic Advisers staff
 
in Washington, was brought to Korea as a member of the Statistical
 
Advisory Group to devote primary attention to the question. After long
 
insistence by SAG, the Bureau of Statistics withdrew its labor force
 
survey and joined with Mr. Stocking in the effort to develop a more
 
realistic inquiry on "the economic activity of the Korean population."01/
 
1/ Federal statisticians in Washington required several years of
 
discussion and experiment to work out the concepts and specifications

of the labor force survey of the United States. It is not unreasonable
 
to expect that an analogous period of time will be required before a
 
parallel survey fully adapted to the social economy of Korea can be
 
perfected.
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An important problem confronted by Mr. Stocking has been the
 
manner in which the economic activity survey would be related to the
 
technical manpower survey, with which the ROK Government is deeply
 
concerned, but which in the past has disclosed serious defects.
 
Mr. Stocking's efforts to eliminate these defects had to begin with
 
definitions by which to identify "technical manpower."
 
Agricultural Statistics
 
The development of agricultural statistics, apart from the
 
agriculture census, has been irregular and uncertain. A review of
 
the statistical methods and procedures employed by the Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Forestry was begun by the Statistical Advisory Group
 
in the fall of 1958. Dr. Schweng took some initial steps toward a
 
i	study of the role of rice in Korea's agricultural economy. He found
 
the available statistical data inadequate for the purpose. In January
 
1959 the Ad,'isory Group still hoped "that considerable time will be
 
available for work on the statistics" collected by the Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Forestry, but census issues were increasingly absorb­
ing its time. A year or two later the statistical work of the ministry
 
was reviewed by Mr. Virgil Childs of the United States Department of
 
Agriculture as a consultant to the Agriculture Division of USOM.
 
In 1961, a constructive impact upon the statistical operations of
 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was given by Mr. John W. McBride,
 
who for a time was the principal link between SAG and that ministry.
 
Korea's data respecting agriculture were put together into orderly
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summations by Mr. McBride. He sought in particular to develop reliable
 
data relating to costs of production of such staple commodities as
 
rice and barley, thus pursuing the unrealized project of Dr. Schweng.
 
The attractive and useful volume, An Introduction to Korean Agriculture,
 
issued under Korean authorship by the Office of Rural Development of
 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and published by the American-

Korean Foundation, owed much more to Mr. McBride's assistance in its
 
preparation than is evident in the volume itself.
 
Official figures on agricultural production, however, remained
 
highly unreliable. The procedure employed by the.Ministry of Agriculture
 
and Forestry in obtaining them was described by Dr. Tepping as "the
 
collection of what are essentially opinions; they begin at the lowest
 
level of local administration (the myon) and filter through every
 
higher level, finally becoming an official estimate of production.
 
There has been experimental work for several years toward the establish­
ment of objective estimates based on a crop cutting system. Within the
 
next two or three years, Korea could establish a crop estimating system
 
which will yield reliable estimates."
 
Considerable effort was expended by Dr. Tepping and his associates
 
during the later months of the contract in perfecting a rice yield
 
survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. An unexpected
 
dividend resulted during the work of the Bank of Korea upon the input­
output table (see the following section). In deriving some of the
 
entries for the table, the Bank used the rice production data obtained
 
in this survey rather than the official figures of the ministry. It had
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found a much closer correspondence between the first than the secohd
 
in relating the figures to those of the Bank's own family budget survey.
 
It is understood that the ministry objected, though unsuccessfully,
 
to the choice. Nevertheless, it seems to have become increasingly,
 
even if somewhat belatedly, aware of the help that it might receive from
 
the Statistical Advisory Group in improving its survey methods and
 
techniques. In January 1962, SAG representatives consulted with the
 
ministry on the design of a sample for a barley yield survey and on
 
plans for extending the rice yield survey in the fall of 1963. Consulta­
tions regarding "various" ministerial surveys took place in February
 
and a member of the SAG staff made a one-day field trip to observe
 
operations on the production cost survey. In March there was consulta­
tion upon the proposed establishment of large-scale intercensal agri­
culture sample surveys which would provide figures by guns. The ministry
 
also discussed with SAG an extension of its work to fishing and forestry.
 
The Input-Output Study
 
In January 1962 the new revolutionary government of the ROK issued
 
its first Five-Year Plan for the economic development of the Republic.
 
In the following month the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
 
directed the Bank of Korea to prepare an inter-industry or input-output
 
table for the nation, pertaining to the year 1960. The purpose was to
 
provide a tool to assist in planning for the separate sectors of the
 
economy. The original directive specified completion about three months
 
thereafter, by May 31. This was later extended to December 31. Budget
 
allocation was approved in May and work started immediately.
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Coincidentally, an appeal was made by the Bank to USOM to provide
 
experts in input-output analysis to assist in the planning and execution
 
of the study, This request was approved with the understanding that the
 
services desired would be provided under the Korea statistics project.
 
For the work Surveys & Research Corporation engaged as a consultant
 
a specialist in the field, Mr. Marshall K. Wood of the National Planning
 
Association. He arrived in Seoul in early August.
 
Mr. Wood's principal criticisms pertained to the haste with which
 
the work had been undertaken, the brevity of the period within which
 
completion was ordered, the scarcity and unreliability of much of the
 
data upon which the table must be constructed, and the overelaboration
 
that was contemplated.I/ Upon his recommendation a further three-month
 
extension in time was granted.
 
The critical examination previously made by Dr. Cazell and other
 
members of the SAG staff of primary data employed by the Bank in compiling
 
its economic indexes was of considerable help regarding the new data
 
problem. The Bank felt it necessary to plan and in part to execute a
 
considerable number of sample surveys by which to obtain further informa­
tion on inputs into economic activities of all types. In his unpublished
 
report of August 28, 1962, The 1960 Input-Output Study of Korea, Mr. Wood
 
observed that these reports werenot, in most cases, "very intensive in
 
coverage: in many cases only three establishments are surveyed for an
 
1/ 
It was initially to have 400 columns for "activities" and 700 rows
 
for "products." Three additional tables were planned as successive
 
stages of aggregation.
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activity. However, they are probably as intensive as is feasible in
 
the time available."
 
At Mr. Wood's recommendation arrangements were made with the Bureau
 
of Statistics, with additional help from SAG, for the use in tabula­
tions of mechanical equipment at the Korean Data Processing Center.
 
The input-output table was completed in April 1963, on time
 
under its revised schedule. Its direct and by-product utilities are
 
still to be fully determined. The SAG has hoped that some advances in
 
primary data collection would result from the Bank's numerous ad hoc
 
sample surveys and its reexamination of existing data. For example,
 
there might be a retabulation of household expenditure surveys by income,
 
family size, and month. This, in Mr. Wood's judgment, would reduce
 
probable overestimates of consumpticn and permit more accurate projections
 
of future consumption, as well as permitting the inclusion of seasonal
 
items omitted from previous price indexes (see page 61).
 
An English language digest of the Korean press, on April 30, 1963,
 
reported that the Bank's "Industrial Correlation Analysis Calculation
 
Table for 1960" (its input-output table), made public on the previous
 
day, had "lrevealed, among other things, that the past Gross National
 
Product estimate for 1960 was 7.4% lower than the figure arrived at as
 
a result of the industrial correlation analysis."
 
Mr. Wood's report had concluded that the use of input-output data
 
and techniques in Korea's economic development planning would require
 
computing equipment and "a professional staff of high competence, com­
bining skill in economics, mathematics and computers." A suggestion
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he made in line with this couclusion became the genesis of the proposal
 
that an IBM 650 computer system be contributed for research and education
 
purposes in Korea (see pages 45-46).
 
Monthly Survey of Mining and Manufacturing
 
A census of mining and manufacturing establishments with three
 
or more employees was conducted between March 15 and April 5, 1961,
 
covering the calendar year 1960. It was taken by the Korean Reconstructi
 
Bank, employing 729 enumerators. The final report was published by the
 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Korean Reconstruction Bank,
 
the results being summarized in the Korea Statistical Yearbook (Economic
 
Planning Board) for 1962.
 
In its report of May 31, 1961, the Statistical Advisory Group noted
 
that the tabulations of the census were being made manually and recorded
 
indications "that the census is not of high quality." Shortly there­
after the group began working closely with the research department of
 
the Korean Reconstruction Bank on the design of a monthly survey to
 
provide general information on production, shipments, value added in
 
manufacture, inventory, and labor in mining and manufacturing establish­
ments with five or more employees. As planned, this would be "the first
 
instance of an industrial survey based on modern sampling principles in
 
Korea." A discouraging factor in the plan was the severe budgetary
 
limitations against which the Korean Reconstruction Bank was compelled
 
to work.
 
The first round of the new monthly survey was conducted in March
 
1962, collecting information for the calendar year 1961 and the month
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of January 1962. Throughout the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SAG
 
continued to work intensively with the Korean Reconstruction Bank on
 
the enterprise, devoting first attention to the design of the survey
 
and later to the improvement of field procedures and supervision. After
 
the data collected had been manually processed for two monthly rounds,
 
the group helped the Bank's personnel to work out a mechanical tabula­
tion program which was put in operation at the Korean Data Processing
 
Center. Close examination of survey results revealed deficiencies
 
which led to a program of further improvement in 1963. In February of
 
that year, approximately fifty enumerators on the survey staff were
 
given a two-day retraining course, including a lecture by a SAG repre­
sentative.
 
In connection with its continuous attention to the monthly survey
 
of mining and manufacturing by the Korean Reconstruction Bank, the
 
Statistical Advisory Group began research and consultations with the
 
Bank of Korea upon the feasibility of constructing an industrial productioi
 
index from the monthly figures. The Bank of Korea now published such an
 
index based on other figures (see pages 59-60). Although definitive
 
conclusions had not been reached when the statistics project ended, it
 
was hoped by SAG that its research would show ways of improving the
 
Bank of Korea index.
 
Hope also seemed justified that progress would result from an effort
 
instigated by SAG for the coordination of the periodic industrial surveys
 
conducted or planned by the Bureau of Research and Statistics, Bank of
 
Korea, Korean Reconstruction Bank, Medium-Small Industry Bank, and the
 
Ministry of Commgrce and Industry.
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Census of Industry
 
The Republic of Korea intends to comply, through its Bureau of
 
Research and Statistics, with United Nations recommendations that a
 
census of industry be taken covering the year 1963. SAG has worked
 
with the bureau and with an ad hoc interagency committee on various
 
aspects of the proposed census, preparations for which are long overdue.
 
In March 1963, it appeared that the bureau had accepted SAG's long
 
standing and often reiterated recommendation for the integration of
 
the census with a sample survey. This would greatly increase the
 
accuracy of the census results by diminishing errors due to the difficulty
 
of recall of a full year's business activities by respondents in a
 
country with inadequate business records.
 
Population Growth
 
There has been much discussion in Korea and among demographers
 
elsewhere of the rate at which South Korea's population is growing.
 
The official rate of 2.88 percent per annum is obtained by comparing
 
the totals obtained in the censuses of August 1, 1955, and December 1,
 
1960 (approximately 21.5 and 25 million, respectively). Underenumeration
 
in the 1955 census was probably greater than in 1960, leading to exaggera­
tion of the growth rate figure. On the other hand, a high birthrate
 
(40 or more per 1,000 population) anda lowering death rate (conjectured
 
to be now about 10 per 1,000) lead some observers to believe that the
 
present rate of growth is even higher than 2.88.
 
An authoritative review of Korean population statistics was completed
 
by Park, Chai Bin, M.D. and D.P.H., of SAG's Korean staff in Seoul, prior
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to his departure for an assignment in Brazil by the World Health
 
Organization. It appears in Monthly Statistics of Korea, published
 
by the Bureau of Statistics, Numbers 1 and 2, 1962.
 
Work on population projections, some of which are cited by
 
Dr. Park, has also continued by Mr. Kim, Yun of the Bureau of Statistii
 
presently attending the University of Pennsylvania on a Population
 
Council fellowship. Mr. Kim's earlier projections were discussed with
 
members of the SAG.
 
Vital Statistics
 
Many of the difficulties attached to demographic analyses in Kore4
 
result from inadequacies in the data purporting to show numbers and
 
rates of vital events. Deficiencies in reporting births and deaths,
 
including the general practice of deferring registration until some
 
need arises (e.g., birth registration when a child is ready to enter
 
school) result in great inaccuracy. Official registration campaigns
 
have in some cases resulted in an influx of deferred certificates too
 
large for regular registration staffs to process.
 
During February 1963, the Statistical Advisory Group consulted
 
with the Bureau of Research and Statistics on the design of a vital
 
statistics survey which is to be treated as a supplement to each round
 
of the economic activity survey (see pages 66-68).
 
Published Aids to Korean Statisticians
 
References to reports prepared by the Statistical Advisory Group
 
and left behind it for the guidance of Korean statisticians in the
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future have been frequent in the present pages. A relatively full list
 
of such documents, both published and unpublished, has been assembled
 
in Appendix C. Further mention should be made of some which have
 
especially wide relationship to Korea's continuing statistical develop­
ment.
 
The difficulty of incorporating an unfamiliar technical terminology
 
into the native language of a country which is without past acquaintance
 
with the technology concerned is apparent. In Japan, to meet the
 
problem, English technical terms are liberally sprinkled through the
 
pages of technical papers which are otherwise written in Japanese. The
 
same device, though to a lesser extent, is used in Korea. 
 However, this
 
can never be adequate. In the past, Western, especially English, sta­
tistical expressions have been translated into the Korean language by
 
processes of analogy with terms in common use. 
As a result, widely
 
different Korean words have been given the same technical meanings in
 
the work of different students and writers. 
The resulting confusion
 
will be obvious.
 
In January 1962, the Korean staff of the Statistical Advisory Group,
 
under the immediate direction of Dr. Tepping, prepared for publication
 
a Statistical Vocabulary which listed approximately 1,800 statistical
 
terms in English and Korean. Assistance in the preparation was given
 
by a wider group of Korean statisticians, with the understanding that
 
use of the Vocabulary would undoubtedly disclose needs for revision, sug­
gestions for which were solicited. Some 2,300 copies of the published
 
work were distributed.
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In December 1962, the Director of the Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics suggested that the Vocabulary receive wider distribution,
 
and this raised again the question of a possible revision. In January
 
1963, a questionnaire was mailed by SAG to 807 persons or institutions
 
to whom the Vocabulary had been sent. Although the 142 returns
 
included numerous suggestions, the results of the survey (in a typed
 
report of April 1, 1963) indicated that the work of preparing a second
 
edition should preferably be left to liater work by Korean statisticians.
 
The survey did givre rise to a critical review of the Vocabulary by two
 
members of SAG's Korean staff, Professors Park, Hong Nai and Choi, Chi
 
Hoon. It seems probable that these scholars will be able to continue
 
work along the lines already begun in cooperation with committees on
 
the standardization of terms that have been established by the Ministry
 
of Education.
 
Of undoubted help in improving the statistical operations of
 
agencies using the facilities of the Data Processing C-nter in the
 
future will be a manual, Introduction to Punch Card Data Processing,
 
prepared under date of January 15, 1963, by Mr. Fairley for use in his
 
classes on this subject, mentioned above and in Appendix D. The publica­
tion is bilingual, with charts. The Korean language edition requires
 
seventy-six pages.
 
Of broader help to teachers and students will be the two-volume
 
(295 and 245 pages) translation into Korean by Korean members of the
 
SAG staff of Introduction to Statistical Analysis by Wilfred J. Dixon
 
and Frank J. Massey.
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The Korean Standard Industrial Classification, Volume I (Mining &
 
Manufacturing), was published by the Bureau of Research and Statistlcs
 
in November 1962 in the English and Korean languages. Developed by
 
an interagency committee under the guidance of Dr. Cazell, further
 
work on the standardization of statistical classifications is in
 
charge of committees of the Statistical Council.
 
Even the departure of the statistical advisors at the eud of the
 
contract is yielding some benefit to Korean statistical operations.
 
More than 364 of SAG's working tools are being turned over gratis to
 
the Bureau of Research and Statistics. These include seventeen items
 
of equipment; eighty-eight technical volumes in English, Japanese, and
 
German; various professional journals and reprints and about 200 publica­
tions of the United States Government and international organizations.
 
Access to all of this material by "those Korean and non-Korean personnel
 
whose responsibilities warrant such access" has been stipulated by USOM.
 
The Flow of Current Advisory Activities
 
Any itemization such as 
that given in this chapter suffers from
 
oversimplification. 
It fails to give a picture of the flow of work in
 
which the field staff has been engaged from day to day and month to month,
 
as well as the interrelations among particular staff activities. 
The
 
essential accomplishments of the group have been more closely related to
 
this work flow than to isolated achievements, which have more of the
 
character of punctuation marks than of written text in the history of
 
the project.
 
In an attempt to portray the character of this work flow and its
 
diversity, with possibly some of the interrelationships that it has
 
involved, there follows a recapitulation of the interests and activities
 
of the SAG, as recorded in a work report, for the single month of
 
November 1962. In that month the project director arrived in Korea for
 
a six-week stay, but it was also a month in which the staff of sta­
tistical advisors was reduced to four men. A majority of the items
 
relate to matters upon which continuing advice on statistical matters
 
was being given to ROK Government agencies.
 
Discussions with the American-Korean Foundation concerning
 
a suggested donation of computing equipment by the IBM to
 
the Data Processing Center for training and research purposes.
 
Summarization by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
 
of observations on rice yield survey operations. Planning
 
analyses of the data.
 
Monthly survey of manufacturing and mining by Korean
 
Reconstruction Bank. Usefulness of the survey in providing
 
an industrial production index. Plans to study its non­
sampling errors and improve 1963 procedures.
 
Proposed special-purpose survey by Bureau of Statistics
 
of manufacturing and mining establishments producing 55
 
commodities. Its relationship to 1963 Census of Industry.
 
Sample design specifications for quarterly survey by
 
Bureau of Statistics of family expenditures.
 
Bureau of Statistics Survey of the Economic Activity of
 
the Population. Analysis of tabulations with calculation
 
of sampling errors for selected estimates. Training of
 
enumerators.
 
Revision of Monthly Survey by Ministry of Commerce and
 
Industry eC industrial establishments producing 323 com­
modities. Attempt to coordinate with surveys of industrial
 
establishments by the Korean Reconstruction Bank and the
 
Bureau of Statistics.
 
Plans for a Korean statistical congress discussed with
 
university professors and the Asia Foundation.
 
-81-

Family Planning Association study under grant by the
 
Population Council of New York. Tabulations and agency
 
to make them.
 
Business relations between IBM and Korean agencies following
 
departure of the SAG.
 
Extension of industrial classification by a Subcommittee of
 
Statistical Council from manufacturing and mining to other
 
economic activities.
 
Preparation by Statistical Council Subcommittee on Occupational
 
Classification of list of occupational titles. 
Preparation

of descriptions and explanation of general principles on which
 
based.
 
Methods and coverage of Technical Manpower Survey of 1963.
 
First priority tables of population and.housing census,
 
based on completed tabulations. Planning and thulation
 
of agriculture census post enumeration survey.
 
The preceding list may suggest that the improvement of Korea's
 
statistics has been a process analogous to the "socialization" process
 
within a group, in which the less experienced and sophisticated members
 
mingle freely with those of broader education and outlook.
 
--
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Ix
 
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE STATISTICAL ORGANIZATION
 
The improved climate now surrounding statistics in Korea will be
 
described in Chapter X. It is
more favorable than in 1958 for the
 
creation of a genuine statistical system. As the statistica contract
 
ends, foundations and framework for such a system are in place, but the
 
superstructure is still to be completed. 
Much of the lip service of
 
five years ago to "needs for statistics" -- regardless of quality 

has changed to comprehension of the attributes that a good statistical
 
system must have: 
 official and public support, statistical standards,
 
accuracy, cooperation, central control and coordination. Korean accept­
ance of these attributes also began with lip service.
 
For example, the monthly report of SAG for September 1959 records
 
the approval by the Council of State of "regulations for conducting the
 
statistical activities of the various agencies of the ROK Government."
 
Their purpose was "to 
improve the accuracy of various statistical series,
 
prevent duplication of effort and to coordinate the statistical activities
 
of the different Ministries." No translation has been found of these
 
"regulations," 
nor is it known whether they were ever promulgated. If
 
so, there is no evidence that an administrative mechanism to effectuate
 
them was provided.
 
The greatest source of encouragement to SAG is the growing habituation
 
of Koreans in different agencies to consult upon questions of common concern.
 
This is an indispensable element of a statistical system, and here the
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record of accomplishment by the Statistical Advisory Group is clear.
 
Through the group's initiative, and for the first time in their national
 
experience, the appropriate personnel of different (and often competing)
 
statistical units are now meeting together and serving on committees
 
together for the consideration of questions that affect all of them.
 
Instances of such meetings and committees are recorded with
 
increasing frequency in the periodic reports of the Statistical Advisory
 
Group. Thus, in early 1959, about one year from its launching, the SAG
 
encouraged the creation of an Agriculture Census Advisory Committee
 
composed of officials of the Bank of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry, Agricultural Bank, Ministry of Reconstruction, Ministry of
 
Education, Agricultural Cooperation Association, Institute of Agriculture,
 
Economic Development Council, and several university professors. The
 
first meeting of the Committee on July 9, 1959, was "the first time in
 
Korea in this field that technicians have been brought together to discuss
 
and advise on governmental proposals not yet formally adopted."
 
The establishment in 1959 of the Census Council recommended by SAG
 
in the previous year also brought early occasions for representatives of
 
different government agencies to confer with regularity. Its secretariat,
 
created in March, was initially composed of bureau directors from three
 
ministries, the director of the research department of the Bank of Korea,
 
and Dr. TchahKyun Hae, economic planning officer of the Ministry of
 
Reconstruction, as secretary general. By July this working group, as
 
it came to be called, was holding weekly meetings with subordinate
 
technical groups meeting still more frequently. The Council itself had
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held a first meeting in April at which it genuinely assumed the appropriat
 
role of an interministerial body.
 
Relatively recent and outstanding instances of protracted inter­
agency consultation were the working groups that during 1961 and 1962,
 
under the chairmanship of Dr. Cazell of SAG, hammered out a standard
 
industrial classification for Korea and began work on the standardiza­
tion of classifications for commodities and occupations. 
 Itwas observed
 
that as the work of these groups continued, the participants began more
 
and more to exhibit interest in and loyalty to the common enterprise,
 
and to come to meetings prepared in advance for joint effort.
 
Such progress was not without setbacks. As in the case of so many
 
other efforts by the statistical advisors, it was zigzag. Thus, the
 
promising start at interagency consultation made by the Census Council
 
in 1959 was later halted, if not reversed.
 
At its first meeting in April 1959, the Council accepted the recom­
mendations of the SAG that the population and housing census be combined
 
and conducted by the Bureau of Statistics, and that the agriculture census
 
be conducted, as previously planned, by the Bank of Korea. In October,
 
the earlier presidential decree was amended to provide that the Director
 
of the Bureau of Statistics should be Secretary General of the Census
 
Council. By other action, the agriculture census was transferred to the
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, in itself an acceptable move. But
 
the positions of Chairman and Secretary General of the Census Council,
 
with control over its working group, were thereafter lodged in the same,
 
politically minded Ministry of Home Affairs. The relatively high-level
 
-85­
consultations of the working group appear at this point to have ended;
 
and the Council did not resume meetings.
 
The importance of the events last described from the standpoint of
 
statistical organization was the setback they gave to expectations that
 
the Census Council would become an overall agency of statistical
 
coordination and control when the censuses should be completed.
 
In retrospect it seems probable that the traditions of ministerial
 
independence in the ROK Government were too strongly entrenched to be
 
modified by such a new and untried innovation. For example, in July 1959,
 
at a time when the working group was most active, SAG in its monthly
 
report, dealing largely with census developments, expressed the need for
 
"a clearer understanding and better working relationships" between the
 
Bank of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Agricultural
 
Bank. "A resolution of current differences will be necessary for the
 
success of the census of agriculture."
 
In the same month a plan was developed under which the census of
 
population and housing would be responsible for the field identification
 
of households in which there was a farm operator and for preparing for
 
each such household a separate form to be turned over to the census of
 
agriculture. Both censuses would use the same identification number on
 
their punch cards, making it possible to collate and cross-tabulate data
 
from both and making the independent collection of household data from
 
the second unnecessary. During the following months other methods of
 
interrelating the two inquiries were developed. None of them was fully
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accepted or accomplished the objective of integrating two censuses 
that
 
should have been more closely related.
 
In SAG's opinion, the comparative failure of such efforts was due
 
to the lack of a strong and authoritative official body to provide a
 
unifying influence in the statistical work of different agencies and
 
take the lead in negotiations that would achieve a resolution of differ­
ences. The Census Council might never have become such a body even if
 
it had maintained a truly interministerial character. But when the
 
authority it had was concentrated in the hands of that single ministry 
--

Home Affairs 
--
of which all others were afraid because of its political
 
and police powers, the possibilities of genuine cooperation among
 
ministries in respect to the two censuises were greatly diminished and
 
all but disappeared. In effect, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
 
thereafter went its own way in matters concerning the census of agri­
culture. 
 Subordinate personnel were friendly and cooperative, but as
 
ministry representatives they yielded only grudgingly and in part to
 
browbeating by the Bureau of Statistics and to persuasion by the SAG
 
to bring the mi.stry's census plans into line with those for the popula­
1/
 
tion and housing census.­
1/ The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, with some sympathy from
 
the Agriculture Division of USOM, was never wholly reconciled to its
 
inability to obtain, under the statistics contract or otherwise, sta­
tistical advisors of its own. It continued to feel that the SAG had a
 
special advisory relationship to its rival in census taking, the Bureau
 
of Statistics. 
The Bureau, on its part, made claims to legal authority

in census taking, quite apart from that derived from the Census Council,

that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry did not concede.
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It is not unlikely that more progress toward improved statistical
 
organization was salvaged from these seeming setbacks than was realized
 
at the time. The interministerial mechanism for coordination had been
 
effectually scuttled. Nevertheless, considerable collaboration among
 
different agencies -- even those as mutually hostile as the Ministry
 
of Agriculture and the Bureau of Statistics -- had been experienced.
 
Both the conception of coordination and newborn official habits of
 
working together to accomplish it survived. The Census Council as an
 
agency for statistical coordination for some time remained nominally in
 
existence, providing precedent for future attempts that could be, and
 
have been, more successful.
 
The improvement of statistical organization remained a central
 
effort in the Korea statistics project until its termination. In the
 
first of SAG's monographic reports, it sketched two "alternative approaches
 
to improved organization."
 
"On the one hand, the statistical agencies might be left
 
in their present locations within ministries; while an agency
 
of statistical planning, coordination and control in the State
 
Council Secretariat, or directly under the Prime Minister, is
 
given jurisdiction over them. In this location such an agency
 
might be associated with other economic planning agencies. This
 
is the pattern of organization adopted at the end of World War II
 
by the British Government when it converted Mr. Churchill's personal
 
statistical staff into the Central Statistical Office of the Cabinet
 
Secretariat.
 
"The alternative is a technically efficient, modernized and
 
well supported Bureau of Statistics, freed from non-technical
 
associations and influences, which retains its present 'operating'
 
functions and in addition is given the 'staff' functions of a
 
statistical planning and coordinating agency. This is the Canadian
 
pattern, embodied in the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
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"One possible means of assuring to the Bureau of Statistics
 
the independence required by the second alternative would be to
 
remove it from the Ministry of Home Affairs and place it in a
 
neutral position under the Prime Minister. Another would be to
 
give the Bureau an autonomy within the Ministry similar to that
 
of the Institute of Agriculture within the Ministry of Agriculture
 
and Forestry."1'
 
It was added that if the second alternative were chosen, it would
 
be essential for the Bureau of Statistics to "exercise capably and
 
impartially the functions of statistical planning, coordination and
 
control, while enjoying the confidence of other statistical agencies
 
and the public."
 
The promulgation on January 15, 1962, of the Statistics Law of
 
the ROK Government (Law No. 980), together with an enforcement decree
 
2/
(Cabinet Decree No. 512, promulgated March 10, 1962)- were long steps
 
toward the adoption of the foregoing SAG recommendations. The law was
 
patterned after Japanese statistical legislation in the framing of which
 
the project director had participated. It placed in the hands of the
 
3/
Chairman of the Economic Planning Board- the authority to approve,
 
l/ Better Statistics in Korea, page 25.
 
2/ Reproduced in English translation, together with Regulation of
 
Statistical Council (Cabinet Decree No. 513, promulgated March 10,

1962) in Monthly Statistics of Kore-, Seoul, Economic Planning Board,
 
No. 3, 1962, pages 7-14.
 
3/ 
The Economic Planning Board was a new agency with superministerial
 
status, replacing the former Ministry of Reconstruction but gathering

together within it a number of agencies and activities from other
 
ministries, including the Bureau of the Budget from the Ministry of
 
Finance and the Bureau of Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
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disapprove, suspend, or require alterations in proposed statistical
 
surveys which must be submitted to him in advance. This authority was
 
extended to surveys conducted by "the national or local government, or
 
other organizations." Other related authorities were similarly compre­
hensive, strong, precise, and in the direction of a positive, central
 
control over all Korean statistics.
 
Two provisions of the law in addition to those just cited have
 
particular bearing upon the possibilities of improving statistical
 
organization. The first (Article 19) was the establishment of a
 
Statistical Council within the Economic Planning Board "for the purpose
 
of advising and making recommendations on government statistical surveys."
 
It was to be composed of the Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning
 
Board as Chairman and not more than twenty additional members. Of these,
 
seven were to be Class 2 officials selected by ministers or equivalent
 
agency heads; three were to be of department chief level designated by
 
the heads of the Bank of Korea, Reconstruction Bank, and Agricultural
 
Cooperative Central Council (the former Agricultural Bank); and not more
 
than ten were to be "commissioned by the Prime Minister upon the request
 
of the Chairman of the Economic Planning Board from among those who have
 
a wide range of knowledge and experience in statistics" -- referring in
 
this manner to university or nongovernment experts..
 
The second (Article 18) provides that "in accordance with provisions
 
of Cabinet Decree the Chairman of the Economic Planning Board may delegate
 
to the Director of the Bureau of Statistics the powers enumerated" in
 
its Article 2 and 3. Inasmuch as Article 2 pertains to definitions and
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Article 3 requires merely that "designated statistics" be collected in
 
accordance with the law and that regulations concerning them may be
 
prescribed by the Economic Planning Board, the purport of this article
 
is slightly obscure. The legislative history suggests that it was
 
intended to permit the Chairman to delegate his authority for statisti­
cal coordination to the Bureau of Statistics; and his actual use of it
 
confirms the interpretation.
 
Although this appears consistent with one of the alternatives
 
recommended by SAG to the ROK Government, conditions had been attached
 
that have not yet been fulfilled. SAG specified that the Bureau of
 
Statistics should be dissociated from political and other nontechnical
 
affiliations; and this was accomplished by its transfer to the Economic
 
Planning Board. 
SAG also specified that the Bureau be drastically upgraded
 
in professional competence; and this has not occurred. 
It probably cannot
 
occur, as the Director of the Bureau himself appears to believe, until
 
positions of higher grade are established within it. This may necessitate
 
an elevation of the entire Bureau organization to a higher status (e.g.,
 
that of an "Office") within the ROK administrative structure.
 
Two sets of considerations have continued to determine the judgment of
 
the Statistical Advisory Group that the Bureau of Statistics is not yet
 
able effectively to coordinate the statistical work of the ROK Government.
 
The first has just been indicated. The Bureau still lacks, and is unable
 
to attract, personnel of sufficient technical skill, experience, prestige,
 
and rating within the employee classification scheme to work out solutions
 
for highly technical problems of statistical interrelationships and gain
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Second, it is already loaded with operating responsi­acceptance for them. 

bilities heavier than it can discharge effectively. It needs more high­
grade staff for these responsibilities alone.
 
highly gratified that
The Statistical Advisory Group has bec 

several of its basic proposals for improved statistical organization
 
have been accepted by the ROK Government. First, the necessary powers
 
for statistical coordination and control have been established and appropri­
ately placed in the head of a superministerial agency at the center of the
 
There they are awaiting exercise in close association with the
government. 

Second, the
government's ecor3mic planning and budgetary controls. 

Bureau of Statistics, renamed, significantly, the Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics, was removed from its political and nontechnical associations
 
in the Home Ministry and placed in the same agency.
 
take advantage
What remained when these steps were taken was to to 

of this ideal context. The method proposed by SAG, at least until the
 
staff of the Bureau of Research and Statistics should be upgraded in its
 
level of competence, was the formation of a small special group of experts,
 
three to five in number, to assist the Chairman of the Economic Planning
 
Board. They would be in immediate charge, on the Chairman's behalf and
 
in his name, of the complex negotiations involved in statistical coordina­
tion and control. Men of high technical ability and prestige Ji these
 
positions could represent the Chairman in such negotiations as less highly
 
The issues raised in them always involve a
placed subordinates could not. 

plurality of ministries or pseudo-governmental agencies; and there sho.;id
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be no question of access to top officials. A statistical coordinating
 
staff should include the ablest Korean statisticians whose services the
 
ROK Government could command.
 
At project termination this proposal has yet to be adopted, but
 
it has been sympathetically received by several successive Chairmen
 
and Vice Chairmen of the Economic Planning Board. Its nonadoption does
 
not appear to connote lack of sympathy with the objectives upon which
 
the proposal rests.
 
Meanwhile, the Statistical Council has been reenacting much of the
 
early history of the Central Statistical Board, a prototype body in the
 
Government of the United States during the early thirties. In the
 
Statistical Council, as in the former Central Statistical Board, consistency
 
in attendance is lacking. Quorums are difficult to secure. The members
 
have other full-time responsibilities and give low priority to the Council's
 
business. Alternates of alternates attend meetings.
 
The United States experience suggests that such early discouragements
 
are inevitable and may in time disappear. After some seven years, the
 
Central Statistical Board was disbanded, but not until after its staff
 
organization, now the Office of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of
 
the Budget, had become a recognized part of Executive administration.
 
The Statistical Council in Korea gives some indications of a parallel
 
evolution. It has several active committees, to which assignments affect­
1/
 
ing many ROK statistical agencies have been given.­
1/ In particular, effectuation of the program for foreign trade statistics,
 
transferred to it from the Bank of Korea, and the completion of the work
 
on industry and occupational classifications begun by interministerial
 
committees.
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The Council's de facto responsibilities are increasingly to the
 
Bureau of Research and Statistics. If it should develop a usefulness
 
and prestige commensurate with the needs that its creation expressed,
 
the Bureau of Research and Statistics may gain correspondingly and
 
itself become, with the Council's help, an effective instrument for
 
promoting the growth of the Korean statistical system.
 
An indirect result of the developments sketched in this and
 
preceding chapters has been the growing acceptance by the ROK Government
 
of the desirability of central control over the field work of national
 
statistical surveys. The principle itself is implicit in the Statistics
 
Law and the agencies and processes established under it. The utiliza­
tion of modern methods of sampling, for example, is incompatible with
 
the traditional use of bureaucratic channels of communication, upward
 
and downward through the governmental hierarchy, to obtain statistical'
 
information. The changing habits of mind here reflected are no doubt
 
comparable in their long-run importance to those which accompany the
 
development of habits of consultation and cooperation among representa­
tiVes of different agencies which were stressed at the beginning of this
 
chapter.
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x 
THE INTANGIBLE GAINS
 
Demonstrable improvements in Koreq's statistics program "covering
 
organization, administration and operations," as prescribed by the
 
statistics contract, have been cited in preceding pages. They have
 
included improved status for statistical agencies within the ROK administra­
tive structure; statistical legislation designed to coordinate statistical
 
activities; satisfactory housing and other facilities for statistical
 
work; acquisition of data processing and related equipment; training
 
of Koreans in statistical theory and practice at home and abroad; improve­
ments in statistical publications; and numerous technical improvements
 
in statistical operations and in statistical series that are indicated
 
in such ways as by the calculation of estimates of error and their
 
inclusion with published figures.
 
Impressive as much of this progress has been, the improvements of
 
greatest significance have been intangible. Some of them, scarcely
 
perceptible while occurring, are now discernible in retrospect over the
 
entire span of the contract period. They pertain to such questions as
 
the prestige of statisticians and of statistical agencies within the
 
government, official understanding of the needs for statistics and the
 
credence accorded government figures, the public consciousness of needs
 
for accuracy in official data and public willingness to cooperate in
 
supplying such data.
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As suggested in the preface, progress in such intangible matters
 
is continuing and could even accelerate after the contract has terminated,
 
if those in positions of responsibility accept the challenges which will
 
come from "being on their own." In that case one of the major hopes
 
of their advisors wp'uld be realized.
 
An Informed Korean Appraisal
 
of Project Results
 
During the annual meeting of the Population Association of America
 
in Philadelphia, April 25 - 27, 1963, a number of Korean graduate
 
students in American universities met informally by themselves to
 
discuss and appraise the Korea statistics project and its accomplish­
ments. It was a subject with which all were familiar. Some when at
 
home were teachers in Korean universities. Others had been employed in
 
the Bureau of Statistics or upon other statistical work of the ROK
 
Government. As reported to the project director by one of them, their
 
conclusions may be summarized as follows, paraphrase yielding whenever
 
possible to direct quotation.
 
Before the arrival of the Statistical Advisory Group, statistics
 
in Korea reflected "bureaucratic wastage." Statistical activity existed
 
and consumed resources, but was not productive. People knew there were
 
statistics officials, but did not know what they did or were trying to
 
do. There was "more wastage" in the Bureau of Statistics than in any
 
other government unit, but "this was not recognized." Borrowing the
 
imagery of a poem by T. S. Eliot, improving statistics in Korea was a
 
case of "breeding lilacs out of the dead land."
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Suppose the Statistical Advisory Group had not come: the Bureau
 
of Statistics "would undoubtedly have remained in hibernation, staffed
 
with unimaginative people, meeting minimum requirements for survival,
 
eating their potatoes in a small corner of bureaucracy." The Bureau
 
would have survived because of the existence of "a superficial recog­
nition within Korean officialdom of the importance of statistics. But
 
with its numbness the government administration failed to sense some
 
pain resulting from its lack of good statistics. People who were in a
 
position to formulate policies were almost blind to statistical projects
 
which appeared to have little immediate political or economic attraction.
 
This was due to the fact that these people, under great immediate
 
political pressure, had a short-time perspective."
 
Despite the nonimplementation of many SAG recommendations, the
 
ROK Government within its resources has "made the most of recommenda­
tions which were necessary and sufficient to lead to improvement."
 
However, a communication problem has been involved, as a result
 
of which "the work done by the statistical advisors may be undervalued,
 
especially by the lower echelons of Korean Government employees. Their
 
envy of the much larger salaries of SAG members is important in this.
 
They say, look what they /the advisors7 and we do. The result is
 
'cognitive dissonance.' Differences in salaries, as seen by these
 
Korean employees, are far out of proportion to differences in achievement.
 
Since their own salaries cannot be brought up to the scale of those paid
 
the advisors, they tend to disparage what the advisors have done. Of
 
course they don't see the whole picture."
 
Another important factor, the Korean graduate students believe,
 
is the dissipation of the haloes that originally encircled the heads
 
of the advisors. When this occurred, the limitations of the latter
 
tended to be exaggerated, as was also, originally, their superiority
 
of talent. Rumor then took up the work of downgrading the competence
 
of the dehaloed advisors.
 
Such reactions, the students said, were to be expected and should
 
not detract from the achievements of the Statistical Advisory Group in
 
changing the picture of Korea's statistics. "Look at the Bureau of
 
Statistics! Considering what it was five years ago -- poorly managed,
 
looked down upon and understaffed, a dumping ground within the govern­
ment service -- the bureau has become a dragon from a small fish!
 
Five years ago it was the lowest spot to which unwanted employees of
 
other agencies of the government could be transferred, from which they
 
could only hope for an opportunity to be rescued. Now, those who are
 
interested in statistics want to stay in the Bureau of Statistics.
 
For example, Park, Jae Soo decided to make statistical sampling his
 
career, as against other career opportunities, and was in the United
 
States for a year for training as an employee of the bureau. Another
 
is Park, Jae Young. Such people could not be found five years ago.
 
The bureau was then filled with people who had merely been dumped into
 
the trash can."
 
During the past five years, these discussants continued, there
 
has emerged a "group of young people in Korea who want to do something
 
in statistics. Eventually they will become Korea's leaders in statistics,
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provided the conditions exist by which the dead land can bring the
 
lilacs to flower. But for the present the government is not prepared
 
to make conspicuous moves to accept the recommendations of the Statistic.
 
Advisory Group because the complaints would be too great from the
 
diehards of the era of bureaucratic wastage. The statistical service
 
is a subsystem of the larger system whose structure and characteristics
 
stand in the way of statis~ical improvement."
 
A Changed Statistical Climate
 
The well-informed testimony just recorded indicates that some
 
obstacles to the improvement of Korea's statistics are still unremoved.
 
Others will be mentioned in Chapter XII. Nevertheless, there is ample
 
basis for a belief that an intellectual and political climate now exists
 
in Korea that assures continued improvement in statistics after American
 
advisors have departed.
 
At the outset statistics and statisticians were tolerated, but
 
not esteemed. Attitudes toward them were not dissimilar to those
 
attributed to Charles Francis Murphy, leader of Tammany Hall, when con­
fronted with a wave of civic reform early in the present century. To
 
newsmen who sought his views he confided, "Why, yes, boys, I'm for the
 
uplift too -- if that's the word."
 
Korean officials and public were "for" statistics, a word recently
 
brought to their notice. They assumed that statistics were something
 
related to the national development for which they hoped. The word
 
was accepted as a symbol of modernity, although any uses made of
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statistical data were obscure and any necessity that they conform to
 
scientific standards in collection, compilation, or analysis was
 
not perceived. In this context, those performing statistical tasks
 
were regarded either as clerks of a low order or, at best, as
 
second-class medicine men.
 
The methods of collecting data through the lower echelons of
 
local government administration accentuated such appraisals. The
 
customary perquisites were often unavailable for those so engaged.
 
In one reported instance, the task of collecting crop reports within
 
a gun was determined by lot among its staff. The clerk who drew the
 
assignment was then compensated for his misfortune by a collection
 
taken from his office associates.
 
As the statistics contract ends, statisticians are no longer
 
What they do may still not be generally understood -­looked down upon. 

it is little understood in any country -- but the importance of doing
 
it expertly and accurately has permeated the public consciousness.
 
Many Korean leaders have observed these changes and attributed them
 
1/
 
to the work of the Statistical Advisory 
Group.-

The assistant project director observes that rivalries and
 
"in-fighting" among Korean statistical agencies, which have provided
 
1/ On May 15, 1963, the Cultural Medal of the Republic of Korea was
 
awarded to Messrs. Tepping and Rice. The accompanying Citation refers
 
to "invaluable assistance to the Republic of Korea in the field of
 
Also, to "unsparing efforts and outstanding professional
statistics." 

knowledge, which Korean statisticians have been privileged to share ...."
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many frustrations to their advisors, have actually been an outgrowth
 
of the enhanced status of statistical work. When the project began
 
it could be said of any new statistical job that "nobody wanted it."
 
Only when the statistical responsibilities of agencies or individuals
 
had acquired prestige were they worth struggling for!
 
The insalubrity of climate first encountered was not found on
 
the Korean side alone. The formalism of some American aid procedures
 
added to the emptiness of the Korean statistical scene. To illustrate:
 
In the summer of 1959 it was proposed that twenty Koreans be selected
 
for training at the United Nations Statistical Training Center at
 
the University of the Philippines, preparatory to serving as census
 
supervisors and instructors. The examination by means of which they
 
were to be chosen, prepared by American aid authorities, emphasized
 
the mastery of English grammar and literary reading ability. In the
 
opinion of SAG personnel, it failed when given to segregate the
 
candidates whose native abilities seemed most likely to enable them
 
to profit from training and thereafter to serve as leaders in the
 
census. After negotiations by Mr. Ehrman and Mr. Lawrence in Seoul
 
and Manila, Mr. Lawrence prepared and administered a new test which
 
sought to determine the candidates' abilities to grasp the statisti­
cal conceptions and understand the techniques which they would be
 
called upon to apply in their later work. Facility in literary English
 
usage was deemphasized. As a result, the trainees sent to the Statistical
 
Training Center at Manila were said by its staff to be among the strongest
 
yet admitted from any Far Eastern country.
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Of cumulative effect upon the statistical climate have been the
 
lectures, courses of instruction in aspects of statistics, and the
 
informal discussions to some of which reference has already been
 
made. The total number of appearances before Korean audiences by
 
staff members of SAG has been greater than indicated by the selected
 
list in Appendix B. A complete count might well require three
 
l/
 
figures and probably every member of the staff would be included.
 
Lectures or lecture series were scheduled by Dr. Schweng in the
 
fall of 1958 before the National Officials Training Institute, the
 
Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of
 
Health and Social Affairs. In later years, methodical courses in
 
elementary statistics, statistical sampling, and other technical aspects
 
of statistics were arranged by Dr. Tepping and other SAG members for
 
personnel of the Economic Planning Board, the Bank of Korea, and a
 
number of other agencies. Among the final programs of SAG was a series
 
of three courses in punch card data processing by Mr. Fairley. They
 
began on April 1, 8, and 15, 1963, respectively, and were attended by
 
174 students from eight ministries, four public banks, three Seoul
 
universities, several city and provincial governments, and KNAG, an
 
army organization. A summary of the attendance is given in Appendix D.
 
In addition, classes in the techniques of wiring IBM machines, meeting
 
three times weekly, were given to the machine tabulation section of the
 
Bureau of Research and Statistics.
 
I/ Courses in technical aspects of statistics have encountered
 
discouragements mentioned below in Chapter XII.
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Through such means much of the magic and indifference reflected
 
in the early Korean outlook on statistics, together with the formalism
 
illustrated above, has been replaced or is being replaced by a spirit
 
of realism. Perhaps the most convincing indications of this new realism
 
on the part of the public may be found in Korea's daily newspapers.
 
In the regular press digests prepared and translated by USOM is an
 
increasing number of news accounts and editorials concerning statisti­
cal activities and concerning the social and economic implications of
 
the data which are compiled and released to public view.
 
On a more professional level the new spirit of realism was
 
evidenced in the first Korean Statistical Conference, planned and
 
organized by a self-appointed steering committee of Korean professional
 
statisticians. This met at Seoul National University in morning and
 
afternoon sessions on May 11 and 12, 1963. Among twenty-six scheduled
 
topics in the printed program (according to an English translation)
 
were the following: "Application of Statistics in the Medical Field"
 
by Ko, Ung Rin of Masan Military Medical School; "Methods and Problems
 
in Research on Group Genetics," Cho, Wan Kyu, Seoul National University;
 
"Methods of Estimating Labor Force and Population," Im, Tae Bin, Bureau
 
of Research and Statistics, Economic Planning Board; "Problems of
 
Statistical Structure," Kahng, 0 Chun, Director, Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics; "The Importance of Mathematical Statistics," Hong, Sung Hae,
 
Tonguk University; "Statistical Methods in Marketing Surveys," Yun, Ki Chung,
 
Hanyang University; "The Input-Output Table," Han, Ki Chun, Bank of Korea;
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"Problems of the Mining and Manufacturing Sample Survey," Chung, Wu Pung,
 
Korean Reconstruction Bank; "Statistical Education in Middle and High
 
Schools," Park, Han Shik, College of Education, Seoul National University.
 
Among other program items was a symposium regarding the 1960 censuses.
 
These topics and speakers have been selected for illustration,
 
almost at random, though excluding papers presented by members of the
 
Statistical Advisory Group. Without the tutelage of this group for half
 
a decade, many of the Koreans who took part would scarcely have possessed
 
the ability to participate. It is safe to assert that such a program
 
could not have been organized five years ago.
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XI
 
CONTINUATION OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES
 
Ongoing activities such as those in which the Statistical Advisory
 
Group in Korea has been engaged cannot be terminated suddenly without
 
risk that some of the gains from efforts expended will be lost. It
 
is the hope of the group that the threads its members have laid down
 
will be picked up by others, particularly the Economic Planning Board,
 
the Statistical Council, and the personnel of statistical agencies of
 
the ROK Government who may be directly concerned.
 
In the present chapter is singled out a number of individual sta­
tistical series or projects upon which the Statistical Advisory Group
 
was actively working at the time it disbanded. Their inclusion does not
 
in itself imply that past developments respecting them have been unsatis­
factory; although this has been true in some cases. They are briefly
 
described and their deficiencies noted here in order to urge that work
 
upon them be continued and accelerated. In most instances, they are in
 
need of more constructive attention from the ROK Government in the future
 
than they have received in the past.
 
1/ This chapter, which supplements Chapter VIII, has drawn substantially
 
upon the Semi-Annual Report of the Statistical Advisory Group in Seoul
 
for its concluding period, January 1 - May 31, 1963. Material quoted,
 
unless otherwise identified, is from that report.
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Analysis of Census Statistics
 
tabulation program recommended by
Although the curtailed census 

the Statistical Advisory Group is 
well on the way to completion,-1/
 
"very little work has been done by the Bureau of Statistics to analyze
 
results that have already been tabulated ... in spite of
 census 

continual urging by the Statistical Advisory Group."-
/ No program
 
data had been prepared by
for the analysis of the agriculture census 

far as last known to the
 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry so 

SAG.
 
Post Enumeration Survey of the Censuses
 
... little has been
 Respecting this highly important survey, " 
A program for
 
done by the Bureau of Statistics to analyze the results. 

one
 
such analysis was prepared by the Statistical Advisory Group, 
but no 

At this point
in the Bureau has been assigned to work on this project. 

it does not seem likely that the Bureau will obtain from the 
Post
 
Enumeration Survey the information that is available there 
for the
 
improvement of future work in census operations."
 
The final estimate at contract termination
 1/ See above, Chapter VII. 
 then over
 
was that tabulations for the population and housing census, 

For the agri­
90 percent completed, would be finished within a month. 

culture census, then about 65 percent finished, completion of tabula-

The forecast was
 tions was forecast about the end of October 1963. 

based on arrangements for extending the rental of one of the 
two rented
 
use with the two others of this type that were
 IBM type 101 machines to 

purchased.
 
2/ Some work has been done on converting the ages reported in the 
census
 
according to Korean conception to the Western age system, to 
permit
 
Methods
 census in which the latter was used. 
comparisons with the 1955 

of conversion suggested by SAG have not yet been utilized.
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The 1963 Census of Industry
 
In March 1963, the Bureau of Statistics belatedly accepted the
 
recommendation of the Statistical Advisory Group for the integration
 
of this census with a sample survey (see page 75). It was then too
 
late to plan an independent sample survey and methods were worked out
 
by the group, with the cordial cooperation of the Reconstruction Bank,
 
for the utilization of its industry survey to the extent possible.
 
Close attention will be needed by both agencies to make this arrange­
ment effective.
 
Survey of Economic Activity of the Population
 
This new inquiry, replacing the labor force survey (see pages 66-68),
 
has been placed on a regular quarterly basis. Thereis need for further
 
development of the concepts embodied and for improvement in the training
 
and supervision of interviewers and in the operations themselves.
 
Despite repeated urging by SAG, there has been little attempt by the
 
Bureau of Statistics at analysis of the data obtained.
 
Technical Manpower Survey
 
The results of a technical manpower survey in 1961, published by
 
the Economic Planning Board, were quite useless because of vague objectives
 
and concepts, poorly defined terms, and untrained and inexperienced inter­
viewers. The Bureau of Research and Statistics was asked to repeat the
 
inquiry in 1963 in consultation with the Statistical Advisory Group.
 
The group began efforts in the summer of 1962 to stimulate planning for
 
an improved survey, but accomplished little until January when it was
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presented with completed plans that repeated the deficiencies of the
 
A series of daily meetings between SAG and representatives
1961 study. 

of the Bureau of Research and Statistics resulted in joint visits upon
 
Eventually, the
manufacturers, followed by further discussions. 

Bureau of Research and Statistics adopted "many" of the SAG recommenda­
tions, but since these were "out of context," there is still much left
 
"to be desired."
 
On the positive side, SAG believes that bureau personnel has
 
(a) become aware of the more glaring mistakes of the 1961 study and
 
developed a determination to avoid them; (b) been introduced to the
 
principles of occupational classification and to occupational concepts
 
with which they were previously unacquainted; (c) learned that years
 
of employment alone are an insufficient basis for the classification
 
of skills, which must take into account the duties and responsibilities
 
of an occupation.
 
Agricultural Surveys
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has received assistance
 
from the Statistical Advisory Group on a number of sample surveys,
 
dealing with: rice yield, barley yield, food consumnption, farm economy,
 
and farm production costs. In addition plans are in process for general
 
purpose, intercensal surveys which will provide estimates for relatively
 
small areas.
 
All of these are in charge of the research and statistics section
 
of the ministry's Bureau of Agricultural Administration, which lacks a
 
technically trained professional staff. The difficulties of building up
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such a staff at a low level within the governmental hierarchy have
 
already been mentioned in connection with the Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics of the Economic Planning Board. They are greater when only
 
a section of a bureau is involved. In preparation for the agriculture
 
census, a strong effort, supported by SAG, was made unsuccessfully to
 
obtain bureau status for the section responsible for agricultural
 
statistics.
 
The present period is particularly critical for the research and
 
statistics section because of the departure of the Statistical Advisory
 
Group and especially the departure for the United States of Professor Park,
 
Hong Nai, perhaps Korea's most competent agricultural statistician, who
 
was a member of the Korean staff of the group. Professor Park has been
 
granted a fellowship for the completion in the United States of work
 
toward a Ph. D. degree in his field.
 
Industry Survey of the Korean Reconstruction Bank
 
The bank's research department and its statistics section, as
 
well as their superior officers, have not only taken great interest in
 
this survey of manufacturing and mining but have fully utilized the
 
opportunity to receive technical assistance upon it from the Statistical
 
Advisory Group. The survey has received the group's constant attention.
 
There is thus good reason to hope that momentum will be maintained and
 
that there will be continued improvement in the survey and in the use­
fulnesa of its results. Remaining problems include reductions in the
 
variance of estimates for certain industry groups by the refinement of
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lists and by certain procedural changes. The staff of the statistics
 
section will be reenforced in the fall by the return of Mr. Kim, Yung
 
Bai from a year of studying principles and methods of statistical
 
sampling at the United States Bureau of the Census.
 
Vital Statistics
 
The serious deficiencies in Korea's data on births and mortality
 
have long been recognized and attempts to remedy them are currently
 
proceeding in different ways. The Statistical Advisory Group suggested
 
that the registration system be amended to place more responsibility
 
on doctors, midwives, nurses, and other professional or semi-professional
 
people who are in attendance at births or deaths. A few exemplary cases
 
of enforcement were suggested to publicize the existing legal require­
ments, along with a nationwide campaign of enlightenment on the import­
ance of vital data. Visits to local areas by personnel from the Bureau
 
of Research and Statistics to check on the registration system and
 
encourage local enforcement were also proposed.
 
In making these suggestions, it was realized that a long period of
 
time would be required to change the attitudes and habits of the public
 
in respect to such matters. In the meantime, SAG recomme:nded an increased
 
use of sampling and more frequent interviews for the vital statistics
 
survey attached to the quarterly survey of the economic activity of the
 
population. Effectuation of these recommendations depends upon budgetary
 
provision.
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XII 
ELEMENTS NEEDED FOR FURTHER STATISTICAL DEVELOPMENT
 
Chapter XI has detailed a number of specific statistical activities
 
in which the Statistical Advisory Group was seeking improvement at
 
the time of contract termination. If its work respecting these is
 
continued, and which needs to be continued, much of the present
 
momentum of statistical development can be preserved. Otherwise the
 
momentum may be lost. In the long run, however, improvement depends
 
less upon particular statistical activities and series than upon the
 
climate within which it is nurtured. Attention was given this factor
 
in Chapter X. The purpose of the present chapter is to summarize several
 
climatic needs of a general and comprehensive character about which
 
Korea's governmental and intellectual leaders should be concerned during
 
the next half-decade.
 
The Time Factor
 
Approximately 284 man months have been spent upon the Korea statistics
 
project in the field, over a period of approximately five years. On
 
average, professional time somewhat greater than that of three sta­
tisticians has been devoted to it continuously. Adding administrative
 
and secretarial services, the average field staff time was equivalent
 
to that of four and three quarters persons. The size of such a staff is
 
less significant than its quality and the reach of its influence. We
 
believe that the qualifications of those engaged in the project have
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been exceptionally high and that their influence has been far reaching
 
and pervasive.
 
The group's accomplishments have been limited by an uncontrollable
 
factor -- the time required for social change. This factor is in­
escapable in all development, whatever the subject, sponsorship, or
 
geographic area. For example, the following excerpts from an address
 
by the Ford Foundation representative in India, pertaining to farm
 
economic development in that country, apply equally well to statistical
 
To indicate the parallel, references to sta­development in Korea. 

tistics have been inserted in brackets:
 
"Even under the best of conditions, agricultural /statistical7
 
It has to be created step by
development cannot come overnight. 

step, phase by phase, over a span of time.... In development, as
 
in any growth process, there is no substitute for time....
 
purposeful development of the agricultural economy Lstatistical
 
....

system/... involves many undertakings, activities and processes 

... it is concerned with meshing all of these together into new forms 
and relationships that will add up to an improved system ... the 
product must be an overall agricultural /statistical/ system that is 
fitted to the needs and desires of the society.... It is not a
 
single piece of work that can be buttoned up and laid aside as
 
a mosaic of many
finished within a short period of time, but is 

pieces and processes which can only be built up through extended
 
and persistent effort."I /
 
Five years has indeed been too short a time for the technical trans-

Neverthe­formation at which the Korea statistics project was directed. 

less, the project has set in motion forces and trends by means of which
 
the Republic may continue its statistical transformation through its
 
own efforts. Surveys & Research Corporation shares the opinion of
 
1/ "Overcoming the Obstacles to Farm Economic Development in the Less
 
Developed Countries" by Douglas Ensminger, Representative in India,
 
Ford Foundation. Journal of Farm Economics, Volume XLIV, No. 5
 
(December 1962), pages 1367, ff.
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Mr. James S. Killen, Director of the United States Operations Mission
 
in Korea, that although external advice concerning Korea's statistical
 
development and program may sometime again be needed, it is now timely
 
for the ROK Government to try out the wings that its recent advisors
 
have fashioned.
 
The Painful Need to Think
 
The eagerness of young Koreans for education and "advancement"
 
was mentioned in the preface. The writer regards this eagerness as
 
genuine. Korean students of his acquaintance in the United States are
 
simultaneously employed full-time while carrying full course schedules
 
in universities. Their ambition is boundless, their efforts prodigious.
 
Nevertheless, with the ambivalence also noted in the preface, the
 
Korean character sometimes exhibits traits which, when shown by Western
 
students, are attributed by their teachers to intellectual laziness.
 
Members of the Statistical Advisory Group have sometimes yielded
 
to requests to offer courses in statistics for ROK Government employees
 
only to encounter a sudden and drastic decline in attendance when the
 
students discovered that class preparations of their own were expected.
 
How is this to be explained? Does it imply a desire for status as an
 
"intellectual" without the expenditure of effort to attain it? Does
 
it reflect an aspect of the "revolution of rising expectations," in
 
which the fruits of learning are sought as a right without an obligation
 
to earn them? Is the cause and effect relation between thought -- a
 
painful process -- and the value of its end-products overlooked or
 
not understood?
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The anomaly seems related to a "blind spot" in Korean statistical
 
thinking which leaves serious gaps in the results of statistical work.
 
It appears in the neglect to analyze these results (as also the preceding
 
procedures) in relation to validity, meaning, and use.
 
Thus, in the case of most statistical publications, "no thought
 
has been given to the needs, if any, of the recipients. No appraisal
 
as
of demand for or use of the data has been made .... It is though
 
publishing is an end in itself, as indeed it may be."" Again, data are
 
published "without explanation of their possible or probable deficiencies,
 
leading to false conclusions and to the use of such data for purposes
 
not consonant with their meaning or validity."1
 '
 
Blind spots are illustrated by the failure to make any real analysis
 
of the information obtained in the new survey of the economic activity of
 
the population mentioned in Chapter XI. The likelihood of its improve­
ment was deemed doubtful by the Statistical Advisory Group, at the time
 
its service ended, because of "the unfortunate tendency to treat sta­
tistical activities in a routine fashion once they have begun."
 
For quite different but analogous reasons the group felt doubts
 
that the Statistical Council would become an effective instrument for
 
the improvement of statistics in Korea. Starting with monthly meetings
 
when the regulations governing itwere promulgated in March 1962, the
 
Council had but three meetings in the last half of that year and only
 
one in the first five months of 1963. Once more, the reasons are difficult
 
1/ Statistical Publications in Korea, July 5, 1961, pages 3 and 5.
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to pinpoint. Are Council members overloaded with work in their regular
 
positions? Are they indifferent to the technical and administrative
 
questions to which they are asked to give attention? Or are the kudos
 
of Council membership being enjoyed without a sense of need to work for
 
them?
 
The cause and effect relation between mental effort and achievement
 
has to be learned. Despite the earnestness and obvious sincerity of
 
agency heads like Director Kahng, 0 Chun of the Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics, it is a lesson that many Koreans in statistical agencies,
 
including some with considerable responsibility, have not learned -­
or, if learned, to which they appear indifferent. They seem to hope
 
that the good things of life, including salaries, will come easily,
 
without effort. Their work is routine, absentminded, lacking self­
criticism. Ingenuity is frequently devoted to the invention of short­
cuts as alternatives to the mental labor of planning thorough technical
 
or administrative programs.
 
The failure to plan a sufficient time in advance for such a major
 
statistical enterprise as the 1963 census of industry was mentioned on
 
page 106. It may reflect the pressure of other work and official
 
demands upon the Bureau of Research and Statistics, in which case
 
official judgments somewhere concerning work priorities must be
 
criticized. If it reflects unfamiliarity with the complexities involved
 
in adequate census preparations, which were constantly reiterated by the
 
Statistical Advisory Group over a long period of time, the wish to avoid
 
hard work is unavoidably implied.
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If Korea's statistical development is to continue, it must receive
 
an intensive application at all levels of service of Lhe superior
 
intellectual capacities that Koreans unquestionably possess.
 
Utilization of Available Competence
 
in Responsible Positions
 
The quality of a nation's statistics, and hence the realism of
 
its social and economic policies, can be no better than the technical
 
abilities of those who produce the statistics. In Korea there is
 
increasing recognition of this Western truism and there has been con­
siderable upgrading in the qualifications of those occupying statisti­
cal positions; but overall these qualifications remain too low. It is
 
commonplace to say that statistical personnel should have more technical
 
training.
 
The force of this statement, inwhich we concur, has been lessened
 
by the nonuse or inefficient use by the ROK Government of available
 
services by technically trained people. The incentives held out to
 
such persons for government service, especially to those trained abroad,
 
are weak in the face of employment practices that place age and seniority
 
ahead of ability; that assign important posts in statistical agencies to
 
persons without qualifications for them; that accord little credit in
 
appointments or promotions to technical training and experience.
 
An example was the release from the Bureau of Statistics in 1961
 
of the only two men then on its staff who, in the opinion of the
 
Statistical Advisory Group, had sufficient technical ability and
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experience to plan and carry on the Bureau's work. One of them, Park,
 
Chai Bin, M.D., D.P.H. (Stanford University), after temporary employ­
ment in the Korean staff of SAG, accepted a technical assignment with
 
the World Health Organization and is now in its service in Brazil.
 
Another example pertained to a selected group of twenty-six
 
government employees sent to Tokyo under the statistics contract for
 
six weeks of IBM training in data processing machine operations. Their
 
trip was timed so as best to serve census data processing schedules.
 
After the return of twenty-five to Seoul, nearly half were assigned to
 
positions within the ROK Government in which this special training could
 
not be utilized. At the same time, the tabulation section of the bureau,
 
from which most had been selected, was suffering from a shortage of
 
staff possessed of the training these former employees had received.
 
Still another example relates to the establishment (see pages 121-124)
 
of an all-important mechanism for central control and coordination of
 
statistics. It awaits the appropriate assignment of three to five
 
highly competent Korean statisticians. Men are available who would
 
meet the requirements, although already engaged elsewhere in productive
 
work. Whatever the reasons, the needed assignments have not been made.
 
Recognition of Statistics as
 
Technical and Professional
 
This is a closely related topic. The technical training in sta­
tistics which an increasing number of young Koreans are receiving in
 
the United States or other foreign countries, and the opportunities it
 
brings them to remain there (assuming legal requirements can be met)
 
--
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are not offset by inducements to return home. It cannot be expected
 
that the home country will offer them salaries commensurate with those
 
It could offer them professional
for equivalent positions in the West. 

status and the deference and prestige accorded scientists and members
 
of professions in other fields.
 
There are probably survivals here of the traditional Chinese
 
(and Korean) emphasis upon classical learning. The chief present
 
obstacle to an enhanced status for statisticians appears to result from
 
lack of understanding of the nature of their work. There is a lag in
 
official and public recognition that statistics is a field of science 

that those who take advanced training in its theory and practice should
 
be accorded scientific and professional standing. Until such recog­
nition is given it will be difficult, for example, for the Bureau of
 
Research and Statistics, in spite of its enormous advances in public
 
esteem (see pages 95-98), to obtain a position among government agencief
 
commensurate with the technical character and requirements of the work
 
given it.
 
Fortunately, there are many evidences, some of which have been
 
given in this report, of recent and favorable changes in official and
 
public evaluations of statistics and statisticians. If the trends in
 
this direction continue, as there seems no reason to doubt, Korea may
 
not lose to other countries in the future a high proportion of its
 
talented and statistically trained young people.
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Growth of a Statistical Profession
 
National statistical improvement is inseparable from a close and
 
continuing association among those in statistical work. People
 
engaged upon the same project, whether in government, the universities,
 
or business, will be in constant communication. Those working upon
 
projects which should be related (for example, the five industry
 
surveys mentioned on page 123) need to be familiar with each other's
 
objectives, plans, and procedures through frequent discussion and
 
negotiation. The facilitation of such discussion and negotiation
 
is one of the chief contributions of a coordinating staff.
 
Superimposed upon individual association related to specific
 
activities will be an awareness of professional identification as
 
statisticians. This will embrace all who have similar or closely
 
related interests, whether theoretical or applied, and whatever the
 
specific nature of their work and whoever the employers. This
 
"consciousness of kind," as it was called by the American sociologist
 
Franklin H. Giddings, will override and supplement but not replace the
 
loyalties and responsibilities of individuals to their respective tasks.
 
Those who develop this consciousness in the field of statistics will
 
regard themselves as belonging to the same profession.
 
Such people in any country will tend to seek additional means of
 
association and communication among themselves by the formation of an
 
organized association or society. The International Statistical Institute
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has listed fifty-two national statistical societies in all of the
 
continents.- / Fifteen of them have met the rigid requirements of the
 
Institute for affiliation with itself. Following is one entry:
 
Korean Statistical Association
 
Founded: 1959 
Address: Bureau of Statistics, Home Ministry, Seoul 
Pres.: Soon-Eung Chung; Secr.: Young-Jo Han 
Members: Regular and Special members 
Plenary meetings: One per annum 
Information which is given for other statistical societies on such matters
 
as dues, number of members, and publications does not appear.
 
Behind this entry is a history of naivete on the part of both the
 
project director and leaders of ROK statistical activities. The growth
 
in a Western sense of a statistical profession and the organization of
 
a professional statistical association were among the early goals of the
 
former, communicated to and urged upon Korean officials and technicians.
 
But professional interests and professional societies as known in Western
 
countries have little precedent in Korea. When such societies have been
 
created, they have tended to be "paper organizations." Designation by
 
whatever means as an officer of one of these paper organizations has been
 
more equivalent to an honorific citation than to a bestowal of responsi­
bilities. The suggestion of a "statistical association," therefore, was
 
easily seized upon in form with little conception of a corresponding
 
organizational substance.
 
With possibly more realism than in parallel instances that could be
 
described, "The Korean Statistical Association" was established by the
 
l/ Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1961,
 
pages 152-165.
 
-120-

Director of the Bureau of Statistics as a part of his organization, with
 
its name, along with that of the bureau, on the building entrance. It
 
was given a room in the bureau's offices with its name on the door.
 
The room was ostensibly to contain a library when acquired.
 
The obvious next step was to gain national and international
 
recognition. In the draft of a communication petitioning affiliation
 
with the International Statistical Institute, the Director reported 4,000
 
members. These included the hypothetical holders of statistical positions
 
in guns, proposed in an act that was being drafted for presentation to
 
the General Assembly. The question of dues did not arise until somewhat
 
later when SAG's chief of party, Mr. Lawrence, inquired concerning his
 
own. A payment from him was presently accepted and acknowledged by a
 
receipt numbered "12,1 suggesting that the Director must have hastened
 
to pay dues ahead of him.
 
In spite of such beginnings out of Alice in Wonderland, the outlook
 
for a genuine statistical profession and organization in Korea is
 
promising. A few meetings of the "Association" were held and showed
 
some promise. One of these, to listen to a farewell address by Mr. Lawrence,
 
heard also a carefully prepared and informative paper by Mr. Ahn, Chang Jik,
 
assistant director of the research department of the Bank of Korea and
 
former trainee of the Census Bureau in Washington. It described and
 
interpreted the Bank's statistical activities. The "Association" has
 
seemingly "gone with the wind," leaving little if any substance or record
 
behind it. Meanwhile, the first Korean Statistical Conference (see pages 102­
103) has been a more encouraging indication of the growth of a professional
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consciousness among Korean statisticians. After the conference, "a
 
number of the speakers and other interested persons assembled ... for
 
the purpose of considering the establishment of a statistical associa­
tion. Three men were designated to constitute an organizing committee.
 
The first step of this committee will be to communicate with persons
 
invited to the Statistical Conference to determine their interest in
 
the organization of a statistical association. The statistical associa­
tion would sponsor a number of conferences annually and also publish
 
some kind of journal. It is contemplated that the papers presented
 
'
 
at the Conference would be published in an early issue of such a journal."
 
The problem of finding financial support for professional organiza­
tions and for professional meetings like the Statistical Conference was
 
solved in the case of that conference by a grant from the Asia Foundation.
 
Incapacity for self-support is one of the greatest obstacles to the kind
 
of professional statistical activities with which Western nations are
 
familiar. It provided a plausible rationale for the captive status
 
within the Bureau of Statistics of the first "Korean Statistical
 
Association."
 
Faster Growth of a Statistical System
 
Underlying all efforts of the Statistical Advisory Group has been
 
the hope of leaving behind it well established beginnings of a function-

For nearly two years a realization of this hope
ing statistical system. 

- May 31, 1963, Statistical Advisory
1/ Semi-Annual Report, January 1 

Group, Seoul, Korea, page 10.
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has seemed within grasp. Lacking has been a final push past the takeoff
 
point that would assure the system's creation and continued growth,
 
without danger of retrogression.
 
A statistical system includes many separate statistical activities,
 
usually serving different purposes and under different ministerial or
 
other managements, that nevertheless are so interrelated as to provide
 
mutual support for the processes and findings of each. They intermesh.
 
Intermeshing or integration are also essential or at least highly
 
desirable when any activities impinge upon others in respect to the
 
timing of surveys, the identity of the respondents who are queried,
 
the definitions employed in collecting information, the time periods
 
for which data are obtained, the classifications used in tabulation, the
 
use of data processing equipment, the scheduling of publication, or
 
any of many other respects in which overlapping or unnecessary duplica­
tion of work are otherwise probable or possible.
 
The processes of intermeshing or integration of effort in matters
 
of this kind are called statistical coordination. To be effective,
 
coordination requires some degree of central statistical control. In
 
the absence of coordination and control -- for example to insure that
 
by means of a standard industry classification primary data on manu­
facturing production can be related to figures on manufacturing employ­
ment to produce figures on productivity -- much of the value of many
 
statistical activities may be sharply reduced. The money expended
 
upon them may to a large extent be wasted.
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This was the situation in Korea when, for example, at the end of
 
1962, five overlapping surveys of industrial production were under way
 
or being planned simultaneously by as many separate agencies of the
 
ROK Government. To have brought these five surveys into a coordinated
 
program would have been an appropriate function for a small staff of
 
statistical coordinators. They would have needed unquestioned technical
 
ability, prestige of personality and office, and authority behind
 
them sufficient to sway the actions of top ministerial officials.
 
SAG suggested two alternative directions of development for Korea
 
to enable it to handle such situations.- One was a small special staff
 
close to the center of governmental authority to exercise statistical
 
coordinating functions. This was the well established pattern in the
 
Governments of the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The
 
second would follow the precedent of Canada by placing statistical
 
coordinating responsibilities within the Bureau of Statistics, Korea's
 
most important collector and processor of statistical data. The first
 
of two conditions attached by SAG to the second alternative was met when
 
the Bureau of Statistics was comparatively dissociated from political
 
and other nontechnical influences within the Ministry of Home Affairs
 
by its transfer to the Economic Planning Board. The second condition,
 
that it be provided with a technical staff of a much higher level of
 
competence than it now possesses, has not been met.
 
The ROK Government has apparently accepted the second alternative.
 
If its choice is maintained and if it is to bring about the development
 
1/ Better Statistics in Korea, Chapter IV and pages 42-43.
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of a statistical system, the Bureau of Statistics must be strengtheni
 
sufficiently to become an effective coordinating agency. This will 1
 
useful in itself, but itwill take considerable time; hence SAG has
 
greatly preferred its first alternative.
 
Whichever of the two choices may ultimately be settled upon, thl
 
establishment somewhere in the ROK Government of a strong central
 
controlling and coordinating mechanism is the single most pressing
 
statistical need that remains behind after the departure of the
 
Statistical Advisory Group.
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APPENDIX A
 
Names, Functions, and Dates of Service in Korea of Members of Field Staff,
 
Statistical Advisory Group
 
Surveys & Research Corporation
 
The following list includes the names and dates of service
 
of all Americans who served in Korea in any capacity, however
 
temporary, under the contract during its five years of operation,
 
It does not include the names of members of the Korean staff who
 
were locally engaged and paid from counterpart funds supplied by
 
the ROK Government. As indicated, the list is limited to those
 
who served on the field staff. Mention should be made, however,
 
of two additional data processing advisors, Mr. Benny W. Blosser
 
and Mr. Charles E. Greene, who, together with Mr. Binder, data
 
processing consultant, performed services in Washington, D.C. in
 
September and October 1959 involving preparation of criteria and
 
specifications to aid the Korean Government in the selection of
 
Project Director
 
Dr. Stuart A. Rice
 
Dates of Service in Korea:
 
May 7, 1958 - July 28, 1950 
March 11, 1960 - April 8, 1960 
June 10, 1960 - December 9, 1960 
July 27, 1961 - August 29, 1961 
January 1, 1962 - January 29, 1962 
November 2, 1962 - December 17, 1962 
Assistant Project Director
 
Mr. Libert Ehrman
 
Dates of Service in Korea:
 
April 6, 1959 - May 18, 1959
 
October 12, 1959 - November 6, 1959
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Statistical Advisors 
Gabriel F. Cazell June 16, 1961 - November 14, 1962 
Lorand Dabasi-Schweng 
Scott V. Fairley 
Harold Israel 
May 16, 1958 
June 29, 1960 
July 13, 1960 
-
-
-
March 16, 1960 
May 31, 1963 
May 31, 1963 
Charles B. Lawrence, Jr. April 1, 1959 - August 27, 1960 
(Chief of Party from January 1, 1960) 
John W. McBride May 9, 1960 - November 6, 1961 
Herbert 0. Rogers May 16, 1958 - March 18, 1960 
(Chief of Party from July 29, 1958 
to March 18, 1960) 
Collis Stocking 
Benjamin J. Tepping 
April 21, 1962 
December 3, 1960 
-
-
May 31, 
May 31, 
1963 
1963 
(Chief of Party) 
David Yentis September 19, 1960 - March 12, 1962 
Consultants 
Sidney Binde 
J. Edward Ely 
James S. Fitzgerald 
J. Arnold King 
March 16, 1959 
October 19, 1961 
October 18, 1960 
August 9, 1960 
August 28, 1961 
-
-
-
-
-
May 15, 1959 
December 9, 1961 
February 25, 1961 
September 16, 1960 and 
October 2, 1961 
Marshall K. Wood August 9, 1962 - August 30, 1962 
Secretaries - Administrative Assistants 
Norma Jean Collier February 8, 1960 - April 25, 1963 
Joan Mary Eiffert November 30, 1959 
June 10, 1960 
-
-
February 19, 1960, and 
February 28, 1961 
Mary Catherine Elward 
Rita M. Johnston 
June 18, 1958 
July 27, 1959 
-
-
November 13, 1959 
September 7, 1959 
Elizabeth M. Lynch March 6, 1961 - August 20, 1961, and 
August 21, 1961 - May 31, 1963 
Marilee M. Wade December 4, 1961 - January 14, 1962 
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APPENDIX B
 
Selected List of Statistical Courses, Lectures, and
 
Addresses Given to Korean Audiences by
 
Members of Statistical Advisory Group
 
1958
 
Cooperation between Business and 

Government in Statistics 

Government Statistics and 

Business 

Practical Application of Statistics 

in Modern Business 

Statistical Development in Korea 

Uses of Statistics in Social Work 

Importance of Statistics in 

Public Administration 

1959
 
Statistical Needs of Korea 

Economic Development Planning 

and Statistics,and 

Problems Involved in Planning a 

Census of Population and 

Housing
 
Training of Enumerators in 

Agricultural Census 

Stuart A. Rice, address, seminar in
 
administration arranged by OEC and
 
held at Onyang Hot Springs, July
 
1958
 
Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, address,
 
seminar in administration arranged
 
by OEC and held at Onyang Hot Springs
 
July 1958
 
Herbert 0. Rogers, address, seminar in
 
administration arranged by OEC and
 
held at Onyang Hot Springs, July 1958
 
Stuart A. Rice, OEC Technical Lecture
 
No. 8, Seoul Chamber of Commerce
 
Building, July 15, 1958
 
Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, lecture,
 
social work seminar sponsored by
 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs,
 
August 1958
 
Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, eight lectures,
 
National Officials Training Institute,
 
October 1958
 
Libert Ehrman, address, first meeting
 
of the Census Council, April 9, 1959
 
Charles B. Lawrence, Jr., and Lorand
 
Dabasi-Schweng, lectures, Research
 
Department, Bank of Korea, September
 
1959
 
Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, lecture and
 
film, officials of Ministry of Agri­
culture and Census Council, November
 
1959
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Korea's Demographic Problem 

Elementary Statistics 

Sampling 

Errors in Surveys 

Elementary Statistical 

Methods 

Lectures 

Lecture 

Lecture 

Marketing Surveys 
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1960
 
Stuart A. Rice, address, Korean
 
Institute of Demographic Research,
 
March 26, 1960
 
1962
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, lecture series,
 
for.pers6nnel of the Economic
 
Planning Board, January and February
 
1962
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, lecture, Researc
 
Section, Ministry of Public Informa­
tion, April 6, 1962
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, lecture, Research
 
and Statistics Section, Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Forestry, April 27,
 
1962
 
Gabriel F. Cazell, weekly lectures,
 
Bank of Korea, April, May, June 1962
 
Collis Stocking, for survey inter­
viewers' class August 10, 1962, and
 
in-service training class for govern­
ment statisticians, August 20, 1962,
 
at Kun Kuk University
 
1963
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, for enumerators
 
for the Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry Farm Survey, January 14,
 
1963
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, for enumerators
 
engaged by Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics for field work in 1963,
 
January 16, 1963
 
Benjamin J. Tepping, address,
 
National Training Center on Agricul­
tural Marketing, February 9, 1963
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1963 (concluded) 
Basic Statistical Methods Lectures by staff members during 
week of training of enumerators 
for Farm Economic Survey of 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry; for field work of 
Bureau of Research and Statis­
tics; and for other government 
personnel. January 1963 
Sampling Methods Benjamin J. Tepping, lecture class 
three hours per week three months 
for personnel of Bureau of Research 
and Statistics, February - May 1963 
Machine Data Processing Scott V. Fairley, Director, eleven 
orientation classes for 174 repre­
sentatives of 18 Korean agencies, 
February, March, April 1963 
Techniques of IBM Wiring Harold Israel and Scott V. Fairley, 
classes three times weekly for 
members of machine tabulation 
section of Bureau of Research and 
Statistics, April, May 1963 
The Post Enumeration Survey Harold Israel, address, Korean 
Program for the 1960 Korean Statistical Conference, College of 
Censuses Liberal Arts and Science, Seoul 
National University, May 11, 1963 
An Advisor Looks at Statistics Benjamin J. Tepping, Korean Statisti­
in Korea cal Conference, College of Liberal 
Arts and Science, Seoul National 
University, May 12, 1963 
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APPENDIX C
 
Partial List of Reports to ROK Government on
 
Statistical Subjects (Published Works and
 
Unpublished Memoranda or Communications)
 
Monographs, Published in Seoul in Korean and English:
 
1. Better Statistics in Korea, November 21, 1960
 
2. Statistical Publications in Korea, July 5, 1961
 
3. Statistical Vocabulary, January 1, 1962
 
4. A Sample Survey Service in Korea, February 1, 1962
 
5. Korean Import and Export Statistics, March 1, 1962
 
6. The Korean Wholesale Price Index, March 1, 1962
 
7. Economic Activity Concepts, March 1, 1962
 
Introduction to Punch Card Data Processing, January 15, 1963
 
(Scott V. Fairley)
 
Translation, English to Korean:
 
Introduction to Statistical Analysis, Wilfred J. Dixon and
 
Frank J. Massey, March 1962
 
Memoranda and other Communications:
 
Report of Field Trip to Kyongsang Pukto and Kyongsang Namdo,
 
June 2 - 7, 1958 (Stuart A. Rice)
 
Data Processing Equipment Needs of the Government of the Republic
 
of Korea, A Report to the Census Council, May 11, 1959,
 
33 pages, 7 attachments (SAG report based on a study by Sidney Binder)
 
Status Report on Budget and Program Requirements for National
 
Statistics in the Republic of Korea, June 3, 1959 (SAG Staff)
 
Draft List of Questions Being Considered for the 1960 Census of
 
Population and Housing in Korea, Memorandum to the Census
 
Council, June 19, 1959, 24 pages (SAG Staff)
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Participant Training for the 1960 Census, memorandum to Tchah,
 
Kyun Hae, Secretary General, Census Council, July 22, 1959,
 
5 pages and 2-page appendix (Charles B. Lawrence, Jr.)
 
Statistical Activities of the Government of the Republic of Korea
 
(preliminary report), January 1960 (SAG Staff)
 
Memorandum on Statistical Organization, to the Chairman and
 
Members of the Census Council, September 1960, 10 pages
 
(Stuart A. Rice)
 
Analysis of Korean Agriculture Bank's Tabulation of Area and
 
Production of Rice and Barley in 1959 on 630 Sample Farms
 
throughout Korea, April 18, 1961, 12 pages, 8 tables,
 
5 scatter diagrams (John W. McBride)
 
Suggested Program for Increasing the Effectiveness of the Research
 
and Statistics Section of the Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry (preliminary survey), April 18, 1961, 9 pages
 
(Oh, Heung Keun and John W. McBride)
 
Sample Design for the Surveys of Agriculture Economy, Production
 
Cost and Production Yield, memorandum to Oh, Heung Keun,
 
April 1961 (Benjamin J. Tepping and Harold Israel)
 
Nursing Skill Resources in Korea, memoranda concerning plans for
 
obtaining data on nursing personnel, May 2 and June 22, 1961,
 
including data gathering form, instructions, and tables to be
 
prepared (David Yentis)
 
The Census in Sondupo - A Case Study, July 13, 1961, 17 pages
 
(David Yentis)
 
Supply of Personnel, Machines and Materiel for Data Processing
 
Center, memorandum to Acting Director Chang, Bureau of
 
Statistics, Economic Planning Board, August 18, 1961, 7 pages
 
(Benjamin J. Tepping and Harold Israel)
 
Cultural Differences and the Korean Census, August 1961 (David Yentis)
 
Suggestions for Improving the Quarterly Statistical Review of
 
Agriculture and Forestry, memorandum to Lee, Sang Eun, Chief,
 
Survey and Research Section, Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry, October 11, 1961 (John W. McBride)
 
Report on Economic Indicators in Korea (preliminary), December 1, 1961
 
(Gabriel F. Cazell)
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Farm Mechanization Project in Niiike Village of Japan, 1961
 
(John W. McBride)
 
Letter to Kim, Yu Taek, Chairman, Economic Planning Board,
 
concerning statistical coordination and organization and
 
commenting on Statistics Law, January 22, 1962, 6 pages
 
(Stuart A. Rice and Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Labor Force Survey, memorandum to Kahng,O Chun, Director,
 
Bureau of Statistics, February 13, 1962 (Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Economic Activity of the Korean Population, memorandum to Kahng,
 
0 Chun, Director, Bureau of Research and Statistics,
 
March 2, 1962 (Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Tabulation Schedule for Processing the Censuses, memorandum to
 
Kahng,O Chun, Director, Bureau of Statistics, March 7, 1962,
 
5 pages, 2 tables (Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Letter to Song, Yo Chan, Prime Minister and Chairman of the
 
Economic Planning Board, concerning statistical coordination,
 
March 19, 1962 (Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Letter to Song, Chung Pum, Vice Chairman, Economic Planning Board,
 
concerning central statistical organization, May 4, 1962
 
(Stuart A. Rice)
 
Economic Activity Survey, memorandum to Chang, Sin Kyu, Chief,
 
Economic Statistics Section, Bureau of Statistics, June 19, 1962
 
(Collis Stocking)
 
Letter to Kim, Yu Taek, Chairman, Economic Planning Board, concerning
 
central statistical organization, July 17, 1962 (Stuart A. Rice)
 
Computation of Gross National Product in Korea (third draft),
 
July 26, 1962 (Gabriel F. Cazell)
 
The 1960 Input-Output Study of Korea, August 28, 1962 (Marshall K. Wood)
 
Technical Manpower Study, memoranda to Bureau of Research and
 
Statistics and Bureau of Technical Development, Economic
 
Planning Board, October 26, 1962, November 20, 1962, February 1,
 
1963, March 25, 1963, April 10, 1963 (SAG Staff)
 
Letter to Tchah, Kyun Hae, Vice Chairman, Economic Planning Board,
 
concerning statistical coordination and organization,
 
December 10, 1962, 6 pages (Stuart A. Rice)
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Preliminary Outline for a Study of Technical Manpower Resources
 
and Requirements in Korea, 1963, Scope and Method, January 4,
 
1963. Submitted to Kahng, 0 Chun, Director, Bureau of
 
Research and Statistics. (Collis Stocking)
 
Review of Analysis Presented in the Sample Tabulation Advance
 
Report, January 17, 1963, 18 pages and 2-page appendix
 
(Harold Israel)
 
Letter to Kahng, 0 Chun, Director, Bureau of Research and Statistics,
 
concerning use of Korean Data Processing Center, February 28,
 
1963 (Benjamin J. Tepping)
 
Analysis of the Post Enumeration Survey, memorandum to Cho, Yong Mok,
 
Population Section Chief, Bureau of Research and Statistics,
 
March 25, 1963, 14 pages (Harold Israel)
 
Letter to Kaling, 0 Chun, Director, Bureau of Research and Statistics,
 
concerning use of Korean Data Processing Center, April 9, 1963
 
(Stuart A. Rice)
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Series of Three Lecture and Laboratory Courses Entitled
 
"Introduction to Punch Card Data Processing"
 
Presented by Scott V. Fairley,
 
Statistical Advisory Group
 
April 1963
 
Attendance by Organization
 
Banks
 
Bank of Korea 29
 
Medium Industry Bank 2
 
Korean Reconstruction Bank 10
 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation 2
 
Ministries
 
Ministry of National Defense 41 
Ministry of Justice 3 
Economic Planning Board 4 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs I 
Ministry of Communications 4 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 5 
Ministry of Public Information 2 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 
Schools
 
National Scientific Research Institute 1
 
Seoul National University 2
 
Ewha Women's University 2
 
City Governments 8
 
Provincial Governments 33
 
KMAG 21
 
Total 174
 
